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Marriage Fraud
Kerry Abrams*
This Article examines the astonishing array of doctrines used to
determine what constitutes marriage fraud. It begins by locating the
traditional nineteenth-century annulment-by-fraud doctrine within
the realm of contract fraud, observing that in the family law context
fraudulent marriages were voidable solely at the option of the injured
party. The Article then explains how, in the twentieth century, a
massive expansion of public benefits tied to marriage prompted new
marriage fraud doctrines to develop in various areas of the law,
shifting the concept of the injured party from the defrauded spouse to
the public at large. It proposes a framework for understanding these
new doctrines by demonstrating that courts apply different tests for
finding fraud depending on the value of the benefit sought compared
to the cost to the individual of using marriage to obtain it.
Furthermore, the Article argues that marriage is an ineffective means
for distributing public benefits that serve specific objectives; in other
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words, marriage is being asked to do too much work. As a possible
response to this problem, the Article concludes that lawmakers could
disaggregate the components of marriage to which they attach public
benefits. This would improve the efficacy of public benefits distri-
bution without entirely dismantling the institution of marriage or
jeopardizing the stability that it may provide to society.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, marriage has emerged as an enormously important
topic of legal scholarship, not just in the area of traditional family law, but also
in constitutional,' tax, 2 immigration,3 social security, a welfares and criminal
6
law. The marriage equality movement and its attendant legal questions of
whether same-sex couples can be integrated successfully into marriage as we
know it animates much of this scholarly interest.
7
The scholarship on marriage has been remarkably polarizing in its
definitions of and assessments of marriage as an institution. Much of the
scholarship either advocates for the abolition of marriage altogether or for the
replacement of marriage with domestic partnerships or civil unions for all.8 On
1. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348 (2010); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Many?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667
(2010).
2. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); Edward McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A
Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); Shari Motro, A
New 'V Do ": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006); Lawrence
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MrNN. L. REV.
1625 (2007); Jennifer M. Chac6n, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving,
2007 WIs. L. REV. 345.
4. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Society Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989); Kristin
Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy and the Legal
Construction of the Family, 62 VANi). L. REV. 1085 (2009); Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the
Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS.
L. REV. 1.
5. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129
(2003); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-
Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253 (2009); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes
Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006).
7. See, e.g., various essays in JUST MARRIAGE (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004); see also
Symposium: Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1155 (2006).
8. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing that child-parent and other
dependency relationships should be the subject of state recognition instead of marriage); NANCY
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (2009) (arguing for alternatives to marriage to
determine when legally enforceable responsibilities and entitlements have accrued in interpersonal
relationships); ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 205-11 (2007) (advocating
universal civil unions); Alice Ristoph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J.
1236 (2010) (developing a theory of disestablishment, analogous to religious disestablishment, of the
family whereby the government would cease to prefer some family forms over others); Laura
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191-92, 229 (2007) (arguing that the
traditional legal divide between recognizing caregiving by family members versus friends perpetuates
gender inequality, and that rather than focusing on opening marriage to more people, legal reformers
should develop ways for the state to recognize nonexclusive forms of caregiving, such as friendships).
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the other side of the debate are conservatives who wish to retain marriage but
limit it to heterosexual couples 9 and expansionists who also want to retain
marriage but open it up to gays and lesbians.' 0 The most common compromise
position suggests retaining marriage but also making a registry or domestic
partnership option available."
This Article approaches the issues of how to define marriage and its
proper place in our legal landscape from a different perspective. Instead of
asking the question of what marriage is, the Article tries to determine what
marriage is not. It does so by examining when and why the law determines that
a particular marriage is a "sham" or a "fraud." Charges of marriage fraud are
becoming increasingly common. For example, one company was prosecuted
for arranging marriages between immigrants and U.S. citizens who had never
before met and supplying these couples with evidence they could later use to
convince immigration officials of the validity of their marriages, including
photographs of the brides in their wedding gowns and fancy fake wedding
cakes.12 Additionally, the wife of former New Jersey governor Jim McGreevey
asked a court to annul her marriage, claiming she was "duped into marriage by
a closeted gay man who needed the cover of a wife to advance his political
career."' 13 A major airline sued nine of its pilots for fraudulently divorcing and
remarrying their spouses in order to get early lump-sum payouts of their
pensions. 14 Utah recently codified common law marriage in order to be able to
prosecute fundamentalist Mormons for living a polygamous lifestyle while
identifying themselves as "single" on their welfare applications.
15
9. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771 (2001).
10. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Foreward: The Marriage Cases-Reversing the Burden of
Inertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1785 (2009).
11. See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 198-205 (arguing that government
should continue to support marriage and expand it to include same-sex couples but should also develop
a registration system to support and recognize a broader range of relationships); Elizabeth S. Scott, A
World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 545-46 (2007) (arguing a position similar to that of
McClain, supra); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479 (2001) (advocating a "menu of options" approach); Edward
Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition,
Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 LAW & INEQ. 345, 371 (2010) (same). But see Mary Anne
Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1758 (2005) (critiquing both marriage and domestic
partnership alternatives as not providing a wide enough range of options); James Herbie DiFonzo,
Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 31, 58-59 (2003) (analyzing "bundles" of benefits that
make up marriage and considering which ones are necessary); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage
for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307, 370-71 (2006) (identifying functional components
of marriage and arguing that only its caretaking and economic support functions deserve state support).
12. Marriage Fraud Sting Nets Arrests in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at A13.
13. McGreeveys Reach Deal on Custody of Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,2008, at 4.
14. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint and Application for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cont'l
Pilots Ret. Plan Admin. Comm. v. Brown, 4:09-CV-01529 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2009).
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (LexisNexis 2007); Ryan D. Tenney, Tom Green, Common-
law Marriage, and the Illegality of Putative Polygamy, 17 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 141, 148-49 (2002)
(discussing legislative history of Utah statute).
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Although in each of these cases the charge is marriage fraud, no single
legal marriage fraud test exists. Instead, as this Article reveals, an astonishing
array of legal doctrines exist across many fields, all professing to regulate
marriage fraud. There are marriage fraud doctrines in family law, tax law,
social security law, welfare law, immigration law, and pension law. Many of
these doctrines have developed only recently, as the law has grafted more and
more benefits onto marital relationships. As a result, courts have increasingly
found themselves playing the role of the "marriage police," trying to determine
whether a couple is "really" married or whether, instead, the couple married
solely for the extensive benefits attached to marriage. Husbands and wives have
also found themselves in the awkward position of trying to demonstrate that
they married in good faith by producing documentation of their marriage, such
as joint bank accounts and co-owned property, in addition to evidence of a
shared life together and even evidence showing that they married for love.
Scholars have written about marriage fraud before, but always from
within the context of a specific legal field. For instance, family law scholars
will be familiar with the "annulment-by-fraud" doctrine that has been pervasive
since the nineteenth century. 16 Scholars in other fields, such as tax law, are
certainly aware that marriage is sometimes the basis of a bonus or an entitle-
ment and that it could be invoked fraudulently. But no one has observed that
marriage fraud doctrines exist across doctrinal boundaries, attempted to make
sense of these doctrines as a whole, or developed a coherent explanation of why
marriage fraud doctrines have proliferated so extensively in recent years.
Marriage fraud doctrines, this Article shows, vary considerably depending
on the goals of the benefit a person is attempting to use marriage to obtain. The
fraud doctrines, in other words, tell us what work the law is asking marriage to
do. A close examination of these doctrines and an evaluation of their origin,
development, and current utility can tell us something about marriage's
capacity to regulate the distribution of social benefits.
This Article argues that two basic types of marriage fraud doctrines exist.
The first, the traditional annulment-by-fraud doctrine developed by family court
judges in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, is fundamentally a
contract doctrine. A defrauded spouse could rescind a marriage contract through
the process of annulment if he or she could demonstrate fraud. 17 The injured
party was the other party to the contract-the spouse-not the public. Because
marriage was thought of as a form of privatized welfare, the only legal space for
sex and procreation, and a permanent relationship, the availability of annulment-
by-fraud was severely limited. Only fraud going to the "essentials" of the
marriage-lies about sex or procreation--qualified a marriage for annulment.
16. Albert Momjian, Annulment, in 1 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5.02, 5.03 (Arnold H.
Rutkin ed., 2003).
17. Id.
2012]
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In the mid-twentieth century, the law changed dramatically as the second
basic type of marriage fraud evolved. The marriage fraud doctrines that
proliferated during this time were not contractual in nature, but more akin to
criminal law or civil penalties. The victim was not the defrauded spouse, but
the public. This Article argues that the reasons for the shift from a solely
contract-based doctrine were threefold: the attachment of substantial public
benefits to marriage, the rise of no-fault divorce, and the decriminalization of
nonhiarital sex and procreation. In short, because marriage became easier to get
in and out of, and because there were more benefits attached to it, people had
greater incentives to use it instrumentally.
These new fraud doctrines vary from very simple rules asking that a
couple demonstrate the existence of a valid marriage to the elaborate functional
tests we see in immigration law and military benefits law, where the couple
must demonstrate through extensive documentary and testimonial evidence that
they intended to "establish a life together." This Article provides a taxonomy of
these various tests and theorizes that the more at stake for the public and the
easier marriage is to exit while still retaining a benefit, the more intrusive and
elaborate the test is likely to be. It also analyzes how marriage fraud might
harm the public and assesses the possible social costs of policing it effectively.
The Article thus demonstrates that lawmakers became increasingly
anxious about marriage fraud during the twentieth century and that much of this
anxiety resulted from the attachment of numerous benefits to an institution that
was no longer ubiquitous or permanent. But the Article does not conclude that
we should therefore do away with marriage fraud doctrines. Rather, it suggests
that these various doctrines might lead us to a critical insight about the legal
function of marriage today. Simply put, we are asking marriage to do too much.
Marriage has become the receptacle for all sorts of attempts to solve social
problems, but it is no longer a robust enough institution to serve this function.
Thus, the question scholars and lawmakers should be asking is not whether we
should have marriage but, instead, what marriage is capable of doing.
Understanding marriage as a site for solving social problems provides a
novel approach to the question of whether to abolish marriage altogether or let
new groups in. Rather than adhering to either school of thought, this Article
takes the position that we should isolate and disaggregate the various state
interests in marriage and then reconfigure marriage to retain those features
relevant to salient interests and to discard those relating to interests that would
be better dealt with elsewhere. This approach is far less risky than doing away
with marriage altogether and yet prevents us from further grafting benefits onto
marriage that do not belong there and that the institution may not be able to
sustain. While this approach does not solve the problem of whether same-sex
couples or other groups fit within the rubric of marriage, it does lower the
stakes for both sides of that debate. If marriage were no longer the primary
[Vol. 100:1
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locus of public benefits, then it would no longer be the primary target of civil
rights reforms or, for that matter, state regulation of relationships.
Part I of this Article analyzes the doctrine of fraud-based annulments. It
locates this doctrine within the broader domain of contract fraud and shows
why marriage fraud doctrine deviates from contract fraud principles. Part II
analyzes the newer marriage fraud doctrines tied to various public benefits and
creates a taxonomy of the array of methods that courts and legislatures have
developed to identify and prevent fraud, including what it terms "formal
marriage," "marriage-plus," "functional marriage," and "integrated" tests. Part
III shows why the singular doctrine of marriage fraud proliferated into multiple
overlapping and contradictory doctrines during the twentieth century and
explores how these new doctrines conceive of the public as the victim. Part IV
examines the social costs associated with the ways these new doctrines police a
marriage. It also explores how a more cohesive understanding of the disparate
definitions of marriage revealed in the previous Parts could help lawmakers
disaggregate the elements of marriage and consider ways to reconfigure them
to carry out the work marriage is actually capable of doing for the state today.
I.
MARRIAGE FRAUD AS CONTRACT FRAUD
Traditional family law-the state law of marriage and divorce-treats
marriage fraud as private and contractual, concerning solely the two spouses
and not outside parties. The doctrine gives one spouse the opportunity to seek
an annulment if the other spouse committed fraud in inducing the marriage. i s
An annulment is analogous to rescission in the contract context: it is a judicial
decree that the marriage, in effect, never occurred. 19 A fraudulent marriage is
voidable, not void. In other words, only the defrauded party can attack the
marriage by requesting an annulment. 20 Third parties have no claim.2 1 This
doctrine persists today, but was largely developed in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
22
A. The "Essentials" Test
Annulment may be analogically similar to rescission, but it comes with an
important difference. The courts crafting the doctrine of annulment-for-fraud
18. SeeLESLIEJ.HARRISETAL.,FAMILYLAW 172,78(4thed. 2010).
19. See Mornjian, snpra note 16, §§ 5.02, 5.03.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also Estate of Dito v. Dito, 2008 WL 821694 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2008)
(holding that grandson of deceased husband has no standing to challenge a marriage as fraudulent).
22. See JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 180-87 (2011) (tracing the development of annulment law);
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 99 (2000) (discussing annulment in nineteenth-
century family law).
2012]
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narrowly limited the availability of the claim. Only fraud that goes to the
"essentials" of the marriage can undo a marriage. In the vast majority of the
cases, fraud that goes to the "essentials" involves misstatements or omissions
about one party's ability or willingness to engage in sexual intercourse, and,
specifically, sexual intercourse leading to procreation. 23 For example, lying
about a known inability to conceive is fraud sufficient to obtain an annulment.
24
So is lying about one's ability to have intercourse. 25 Because even people who
are capable of having intercourse and capable of procreation might choose not
to engage in either, courts have also granted annulments based on fraud where a
person represents that he or she is willing to consummate the marriage but has a
secret desire not to do so, 26 or represents willingness to have children but does
not intend to have them. 27 In this class of cases, courts have held that no
explicit representation of willingness to consummate or have children is
23. There are some exceptions. New York uses a "materiality" test that asks whether the fraud
went to something "vital" to the marriage, and sometimes grants annulments under this test in cases
not involving the essentials. See, e.g., Kober v. Kober, 211 N.E. 2d 817, 818 (N.Y. 1965) (granting
annulment where husband concealed his Nazi past). New Jersey distinguishes between
unconsummated and consummated marriages: unconsummated marriages can be annulled for fraud
under a materiality test; consummated marriages can be annulled only for fraud going to the essentials.
Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 304 A.2d 774, 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973). New York's unusually broad
test may be explained by its historically narrow grounds for divorce; until 1967, divorces were
available only for adultery, so annulment doctrine may have provided "wiggle room" to end marriages
where the defrauding spouse stubbornly refused to misbehave. Laurence Drew Borten, Note: Sex,
Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1096 n.33 (2002).
24. See Vileta v. Vileta, 128 P.2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (granting annulment for fraud
where wife did not disclose known infertility); Turner v. Avery, 113 A. 710 (N.J. Ch. 1921) (granting
annulment where wife did not tell husband she had undergone an operation rendering her barren);
Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1939); cf Irving v. Irving, 134 P.3d 718 (Nev. 2006)
(denying annulment where forty-two-year-old wife had repeated miscarriages, based on lack of
evidence of her infertility, lack of evidence that she knew she was infertile at time of marriage, and
because husband should have known a forty-two-year-old woman might have difficulty conceiving but
married her anyway).
25. See Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 N.W. 252 (Mich. 1940) (granting annulment granted
where wife, because of her physical condition, did not intend to have "normal marital intercourse" or
bear children); cf Manbeck v. Manbeck, 489 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1985) (granting annulment based on
wife's impotence-but not based on fraud-where impotence consisted of a "psychological block"
against intercourse that led the marriage to go unconsummated for twenty-four years).
26. Rathbum v. Rathbum, 292 P.2d 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (granting annulment where wife
secretly intended not to consummate marriage); see also Hyslop v. Hyslop, 2 So. 2d 443 (Ala. 1941)
(granting annulment where husband claimed to have changed his mind about wanting to consummate
marriage on the car ride home from the ceremony; court inferred from his actions that his "vows were
taken without any bona fide purpose to keep them"); Zerk v. Zerk, 44 N.W.2d 568, 568 (Wis. 1950)
(granting annulment where wife promised to "perform the duties of a wife and specifically to bear
children" but then refused to consummate the marriage).
27. See, e.g., Mothershead v. Mothershead, No. B177926, 2005 WL 1460412 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 22, 2005) (granting annulment where husband promised to have children but did not want to do
so); Sabbagh v. Copti, 674 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 1998) (granting annulment where husband
stopped having sex with wife after her birth control injection wore off and told her that he had never
loved her and never intended to have children with her); cf Wolens v. Wolens, No. 99-FC-006390,
2004 WL 1909348 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2004) (denying annulment on procedural grounds, but
allegation was that husband intentionally misled wife about desire to have children).
[Vol. 100:1
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necessary; the promise to engage in "normal" and "natural" intercourse is
implicit in the promise to marry, and in making such a promise, a person is
making factual representations of capacity and intent.
28
In sharp contrast, "[f]raudulent misrepresentations... as to birth, social
position, fortune, good health, and temperament, cannot.., vitiate [a marriage]
contract. ' 29 This prohibition has been applied widely, even in cases that would
almost certainly meet the requirements to rescind a contract for fraudulent
misrepresentation. In one Massachusetts case, Chipman v. Johnston, the
husband claimed to be in the mining business, to be related to a prominent
family conveniently located far away in Alaska, and to have substantial money
in a bank in Spokane, Washington, all of which turned out to be false.3 ° The
court denied the wife an annulment because social standing was irrelevant to
the essentials of the marriage: He was the human being whom she intended to
marry. He did not impersonate another. Even though she was deluded as to his
name and place of residence, that did not affect his personality. His
representations as to relatives in another part of the country merely affected at
most his social standing.
3
'
In another case, Beckley v. Beckley, a husband met his future wife
through a match-making service. 32 She claimed to be a Sunday school teacher
and even forged a note from her pastor.33 After the wedding, the wife induced
him to sell her his house and give her $235. 34 She promptly kicked him out,
saying, "Get a move on you and move quick or I'll blow you into eternity."
35
When the husband sought an annulment, the court was unsympathetic. "There
was neither fraud, error or duress as known to the law," the court explained.
"He got possession of the same flesh and bones he bargained for ... the
marriage was consummated; they lived together as husband and wife; they are
husband and wife."36
28. Maslow v. Maslow, 255 P.2d 65, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (granting annulment for fraud
because promise to have "normal" and "natural" intercourse is "implicit" in promise to marry); see
also Gewirtz v. Gerwitz, 66 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div. 1945) (denying wife annulment because she
waited four years to complain that husband refused to have unprotected sex because children would
"annoy him," but noting in dicta that "implicit in the marriage contract is the representation that the
parties will have normal and natural relations and that they will not do anything which will frustrate
the normal and natural result of those relations").
29. Nerini v. Nerini, 11 Conn. Supp. 361, 365 (Super. Ct. 1943).
30. Chipman v. Johnston, 130 N.E. 65, 66 (Mass. 1921).
31. Id
32. Beckley v. Beckley, 115 I11. App. 27,28 (1904).
33. ld.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. Id.; see also Heath v. Heath, 159 A. 418 (N.H. 1932) (denying annulment where husband
claimed to have "sober and industrious habits and sexual virtue, savings and law-abiding conduct" but
had been convicted of adultery); Johnston v. Johnston, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 254 (Ct. App. 1993)
(denying annulment where before marriage, husband was "just very polite. Very nice. Very respectful
to [wife]. Clean-shaven. Bathed. Just very nice," but after wedding, he "never treated [wife] with
2012]
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B. Explaining the "Essentials " Test
Why would courts have so limited the availability of annulment-for-
fraud? Three interlocking reasons stand out as particularly important: (1)
marriage's role as a form of privatized welfare; (2) the permanence of
marriage; and (3) marriage's role as the exclusive site for state-sanctioned sex
and procreation.
First, through most of the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth,
marriage functioned as the primary way to deal with dependency. As such, it
was not merely contractual, but a hybrid institution that encompassed aspects of
both status and contract. The agreement to marry was contractual in that it
required the consent of each party, but once consent had been granted, it
resulted in a legal status "affecting both the parties and the community." 37 As
the Supreme Court put it in the famous case of Maynard v. Hill, once two
people enter into a marriage, "a relation between the parties is created which
they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or
entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. ' 38 Once
a couple was married, certain benefits and obligations automatically attached to
the status, including the right of a wife to her husband's support, the right of a
husband to the services of his wife, state involvement in dissolution of the
union, and rights of each spouse in the property of the other.39 "Society" had a
"great interest" in maintaining this status, for marriage ensured that someone
would provide men with services and that someone would provide women with
financial support. Making annulment easily available would have had
41disastrous economic consequences for many women.
Second, marriage was also largely permanent at this point in history.
Divorce was either unavailable or difficult to obtain.42 If a commercial contract
is breached, the nonbreaching party is generally entitled to expectancy
damages. 43 There was no directly analogous remedy in marriage; the closest
remedy was that an "innocent and injured" spouse might be entitled to a fault-
respect... and on many occasions, unshaven," as well as lazy, bad in bed, and an alcoholic).
37. Chipman v. Johnston, 130 N.E. 65,66 (Mass. 1921).
38. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,211 (1888).
39. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 1373, 1389-92 (2000) (describing incidents of coverture); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The
First Women's Rights Claims Concerning Women's Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J.
1073, 1082 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Home as Work] (describing economic aspects of coverture).
40. Marshall v. Marshall, 300 P. 816, 817 (Cal. 1931).
41. Because an annulment meant that a valid marriage had never happened, it also meant that
there was no marital property to be divided and that a wife would not be eligible to receive alimony
from her ex-husband. Recently, some states have amended this rule. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46b-60 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.095,107.105 (2009).
42. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142-46 (3d ed. 2005)
(discussing evolution of divorce law).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
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based divorce. 44 Even where divorce was available, it did not give a party her
expectancy damages, although it sometimes attempted to ameliorate the
financial pain of lost support through doctrines such as alimony. It is difficult to
quantify what expectancy damages would have looked like in any case; the
mere fact of being a divorcee and the social stigma attached to it may have far
outweighed any monetary compensation that a wife could have received.
Furthermore, a husband's expectancy damages would have included some form
of compensation for lost services, something that most wives would not have
been in a financial position to provide. In short, divorce was not treated like
breach, so it is unsurprising that annulment was not treated like rescission.
Finally, the annulment-for-fraud doctrine arose during a time when
marriage was the only legal site for sex and procreation. Nonmarital sex was
criminalized as either fornication or adultery. 45 Thus, in order to have a legal
46sex life at all, a person had to be married. In addition, this doctrine arose
during a period in which most children were economic actors in their own right,
working on their families' farms or being sent out as apprentices or servants to
supplement the family income, and their wages were the property of their
fathers.47 Whereas we now think of children as an additional expense, limiting
someone's ability to procreate 150 years ago might well have curtailed his or
her very livelihood. The frequent granting of annulments would have created
more single people-potential fornicators. It also might have created
unmarriageable single women, whom courts, by granting annulments, had
decreed to have technically "never married" but as a social matter were
nevertheless considered "damaged goods."
Contrast with the "essentials" test the way in which courts dealt with
marriage fraud claims in inheritance cases. There, the "victim" spouse was
dead, and the "defrauding" spouse stood to inherit, either because of a bequest
in a will or because the other spouse had died intestate. In these cases, the
universal rule was that a third party-the decedent's child, other heirs, the
administrator of the will, or anyone else--could not collaterally attack the
marriage. 48 If the now-deceased spouse had been content with the marriage
during his lifetime, there was no reason to second-guess his decision now that
44. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 18, at 296-300 (describing fault grounds for divorce).
45. See ROLLN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 45-56 (3d ed. 1982)
(tracing the historical development of the crimes of adultery and fornication).
46. Of course, legal prohibitions did not manage to deter a thriving sex trade, especially by the
late-nineteenth century. But the availability of extramarital sex did not make it legal. STEPHANIE
COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 190 (2005).
47. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 234-35 (1985).
48. See, e.g., In re Dykema, No. C5-96-669, 1996 WL 589104 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1996)
(holding that "an annulment of marriage due to fraud is available only to the party who was
fraudulently induced to many.... No mechanism exists to nullify a marriage at the application of any
person other than the defrauded party"); Kunz v. Kunz, 136 P.3d 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (holding
that immigration marriage is voidable, not void, and therefore cannot be attacked after death of
spouse).
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the sexual and procreative functions of the marriage had ceased. Indeed, to do
so might lead to problems of illegitimacy for the children of the marriage
contrary to the wishes of the decedent.
So important was marriage as a safe space for sex and reproduction that
courts almost universally upheld so-called "limited purpose marriages." It was
no secret that marriage gave people access to certain benefits, such as financial
support, legal sex, and legitimate children, and subjected them to burdens. For
men, these included the duty to support a wife, and, for women, these included
the duty to obey a husband, which might entail the duty to engage in unwanted
sex, an abdication of her choice of domicile and management of her property,
and control over her own wages. 49 Because marriage so clearly came with such
substantial burdens and benefits, people did sometimes marry for specific
reasons. A law of "limited purpose" marriages arose, with courts generally
denying annulments in cases where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose. In one case, a man married so that he could retain his
position at work and get a raise, but promised his future wife that he would
seek an annulment the next day.50 The court denied the annulment, stating that
granting annulments merely because the parties had agreed to one beforehand
"would destroy the dignity and lessen the importance of marriage.'51
The most common fact pattern for limited purpose marriages involved a
couple who had married solely to legitimate a child. In these cases, courts
almost universally denied annulments. 52 As one court put it, if the desire for an
annulment "offends decency and the public policy" of the state, then no relief
can be granted, "no matter how much [the husband] has been imposed upon., 5
3
Although courts were fairly circumspect about the specifics of the public policy
at issue, there are hints throughout the cases that two concerns were paramount:
the protection of children born into the marriage, in terms of social stigma,
49. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 39, at 1082 (summarizing property law aspects of
coverture); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife-Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2174, 2204 (1996) (discussing persistence of marital rape exemption and explaining
domicile aspects of coverture).
50. Hanson v. Hanson, 191 N.E. 673, 674 (Mass. 1934); see also De Vries v. De Vries, 195 Ill.
App. 4 (1915) (denying annulment where parties entered into marriage to prevent nullification of
husband's employment contract).
51. Hanson, 191 N.E. at 676.
52. See Schibi v. Schibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married
only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi); Delfino v.
Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to
protect the girl's name and there was an understanding that the parties would not live together as man
and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.
1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child);
Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying
annulment where wife married husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage
because husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).
53. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.
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economic support, and inheritance rights; and a policy of using marriage to
"cure" the illegality of out-of-wedlock sex. 54
The rule stating that limited purpose marriages were valid even applied to
cases in which one spouse married the other solely for immigration purposes.
In one relatively recent case, for example, a Texas court declared a marriage
valid, despite the fact that the parties entered into it solely so that the husband
could gain entry to the United States.55 The rule that "ceremonial marriage
under proper certificate is legal and valid," the court declared, "is one of the
strongest in law and cannot be avoided merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose. '56 These rulings make sense in light of the
doctrine of annulment-for-fraud. When both parties know of the limited
purpose for the marriage, neither one has been defrauded. There is no private
party "victim"; the only potential victims are third parties, including the state.
The contractual nature of the annulment remedy precludes compensation to
third parties. As we shall see, other, noncontractual marriage fraud doctrines
arose to deal with the problem of injury to the state.
Historically, marriages entered into in jest constituted the major exception
to annulment-for-fraud cases. In these cases, courts reasoned that consent had
not been given because the parties did not mean the marriage to have any effect
whatsoever. 57 The jest exception persists today: the most famous recent
example occurred when a court annulled pop singer Britney Spears' Las Vegas
marriage to her high school friend, Jason Alexander. Hours after the wedding
she sought an annulment, stating in legal papers that she "lacked understanding
of her actions to the extent that she was incapable of agreeing to the marriage
because [she and Alexander] did not know each other[']s likes and dislikes,
each other[']s desires to have or not have children, and each other[']s desires as
to State of residency." 58 In other words, there could be no consent without
knowledge, or, as Spears's publicist put it, it was "a joke [taken] too far.",59
Thus, the jest cases can be seen not only as an exception to the usual "limited
purpose marriage" cases, but also as an entirely separate category of cases
altogether: the legal theory in these cases is not fraud but lack of capacity.
54. See cases cited supra note 52. For more on the idea of marriage "curing" illicit sex, see
Ariela Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756 (2006);
Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment (July 22, 2011) (unpublished draft) (on file with author)
(discussing marriage as a punishment for criminal sexual behavior).
55. Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), afid, 440 F.2d 1163
(5th Cir. 1971) (holding that marriage was valid for purposes of bringing a wrongful death action
under the Jones Act).
56. Id.
57. See McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. Eq. 225 (1870) (holding marriage void where vows were
taken as "a mere jest got up in the exuberance of spirits to amuse the company and themselves").
58. Spears v. Alexander, No. D311371 (Nev. Dist. Ct., Clark County, Jan. 5, 2004).
59. Glenn Puit, Britney Spears' 55-Hour Marriage Annulled, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL,
Jan. 6, 2004, http://www.reviewjoumal.com/lvrjhome/2004/Jan-06-Tue-2004/news/22935262.html,
discussed in GROSsMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 82.
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The marriage fraud doctrine used in annulment cases, then, is quite narrow.
Only the defrauded spouse can bring a claim, and courts only accept claims that
"go to the essentials" of the marriage-those concerning sex and procreation. 60
II.
PUBLIC BENEFITS FRAUD TESTS
The contractual model of marriage fraud that developed during the
nineteenth century has persisted into the twentieth and twenty-first, but new
models have sprung up alongside it. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century,
new marriage fraud doctrines developed in the areas of tax, immigration,
pension, social security, military benefits, and insurance law.6 1 Under these
theories, the government or an employer, rather than a defrauded spouse, could
bring a marriage fraud claim. Each of these areas of law has developed its own
definition of what counts as marriage fraud, and these definitions differ wildly
from each other and from the annulment-for-fraud test. In many cases, fraud
that would secure an annulment is not sufficient to create civil or criminal
liability for fraud in a case brought by the state. In many more cases, fraud that
would be insufficient to obtain an annulment is more than enough to result in a
civil or criminal penalty. In fact, quite often there is no "victim" in the
traditional contract sense: both parties to the marriage knew exactly why they
were marrying-for insurance benefits, immigration status, or access to a
pension. The new marriage fraud doctrines acknowledge not only that the state
has an interest in the validity of a marriage, but that this interest might conflict
with the interests of both spouses.
60. Recently, however, some courts have begun to deviate from the long-standing "essentials"
doctrine, stretching it to include cases that not only go to willingness or ability to engage in procreative
sex, but to other issues concerning sex, such as intent to remain faithful. See In re Ramirez, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 180, 185 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the husband's actions in marrying wife while
continuing to carry on a sexual relationship with her sister "directly relates to a sexual aspect of
marriage-sexual fidelity"); Rabie v. Rabie, 115 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (Ct. App. 1974) (granting
annulment where husband never had the intention to fulfill marital duties to his wife, "especially the
duties to remain faithful to [her] and remain married to her"); V.J.S. v. M.J.B., 592 A.2d 328, 329 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (holding that "it is axiomatic that... a party will be entitled to an annulment
when the spouse refuses to have children . .. [and that] the converse is also true ... a party will be
entitled to an annulment when the spouse insists on having children, contrary to the express agreement
of the parties prior to marriage that they would not have children").
61. Pension fraud cases also developed earlier, as widow's war pensions were one of the few
public benefits tied to marriage that existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Collins,
supra note 4 (discussing Revolutionary War widows' pensions); see also THEDA SKOPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 66 (1992) (discussing widespread availability of widows' pensions in the late-nineteenth
century); Katherine Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Post-Bellum Regulation of African-American
Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 283-84 (discussing Freedman's Bureau practice of forcing
former slaves to choose one husband or one wife from several partners in order to determine who
would receive benefits). But it was not until the mid-twentieth century that extensive public benefits
attached themselves to most marriages.
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While each of these doctrines shares a common goal of ferreting out
parties attempting to use marriage instrumentally to obtain a public benefit,
how they achieve this goal varies greatly depending on the legal context. This
Part categorizes the doctrines based on the tests they employ. It begins by
exploring two types of tests that employ bright-line rules: tests that merely
require proof of a formal marriage, and "marriage-plus" tests that require a
formal marriage plus some other objectively ascertainable criteria, such as age,
cohabitation, or being married for a set period of time. It then discusses
functional tests, which require a couple to demonstrate that they are "acting
married" in order overcome a charge of marriage fraud. Finally, it analyzes
"integrated" tests-tests incorporating both formal, bright-line rules and
subjective, functional determinations of whether a marriage is bonafide.
A. Formal Marriage Tests
The simplest test for detecting marriage fraud is the absence of a valid
marriage. Requiring a marriage certificate is an easy, bright-line rule that
simply asks about the status of the marriage without inquiring into its
particulars.62 Formal marriage tests have the obvious benefit of being easy to
administer.63 They make the most of marriage qua status: people might try to
contract around the specific incidents of marriage, but the status aspect of
marriage is robust, and people will be held to the obligations and entitled to the
benefits of marriage regardless of their particular intentions or behavior. The
disadvantage of a formal rule is that it is both over- and under-inclusive. Some
legally married people will not be the kind of people the legislature is trying to
benefit, and some nonmarried people may be more worthy.
Contemporary examples of formal marriage rules include some aspects of
the federal Internal Revenue Code. For federal income tax purposes, a couple is
married if they are married on December 31 of the tax year in question.64 Only
a formal marriage counts for determining whether a couple will be treated as
married.65 Marriage can make an important difference in a couple's tax
62. A marriage that is not legally valid would be a marriage where there is no certificate, except
in states recognizing common law marriage, or a marriage that is void (as opposed to voidable), such
as a bigamous or incestuous marriage. See supra Section I.A. Some laws do not even require a
certificate for most claimants. For example, a spouse's statement on an application for social security
retirement benefits that he or she was ceremonially married to the working spouse will be accepted as
proof if the working spouse confirms it in writing, unless the marriage is less than two years old or
there is another reason to doubt the relationship. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.725 (2011).
63. For the classic exposition on the virtues of rules versus standards, see HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tentative ed. 1958). For a critique of how and when rules
and standards are deployed, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
64. I.R.C. § 7703(a) (2006).
65. As we shall see, federal law makes some exceptions to this rule. A same-sex couple who is
formally married, for example, will not be treated as married under the Defense of Marriage Act, 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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liability. If a husband's and wife's respective incomes are fairly close in
amount, then together they will likely pay substantially more tax than they
would have had they been two single people declaring exactly the same
income. If their incomes are wildly disparate, however, or if one of them does
not have any income at all, then they will pay substantially less than they would
pay separately. These tax consequences are commonly referred to as "the
marriage penalty" and "the marriage bonus," respectively. 66 What happens if a
couple is not formally married but lives together in a long-term relationship that
functionally looks like a marriage? Federal tax law treats them as unmarried,
and if they seek to obtain the "marriage bonus" by untruthfully stating that they
are married, the state can prosecute them for it.
67
Despite federal uniformity in the availability of marriage-based benefits,
whether a particular marriage will be considered formally valid depends on
state family law. As a result, although one might assume that formal tests
would lead to greater uniformity than functional tests, the use of federal formal
marriage tests sometimes leads to wildly disparate outcomes depending on the
state law in question. For example, in U.S. v. Dedman, a recent marriage fraud
prosecution over military death benefits, a young woman named Nelva Holland
had married a much older man, John Watson, and claimed entitlement to his
military pension.68 Unfortunately, she was related to her deceased husband by
adoption as well as marriage: Watson had adopted Darlene Dedman, a family
friend, as an adult, who in turn had adopted Holland when she was nineteen
years old, so that she could list Holland as her child for health insurance
purposes.69 Holland was therefore her husband's adoptive granddaughter, and
under Arkansas law, where this marriage occurred, a marriage between
adoptive relatives was void.70 Because the marriage was void, the Sixth Circuit
upheld a criminal conviction of Dedman (who was both the adoptive daughter
66. For detailed explanations and critiques, see Motro, supra note 2, at 1512; Patricia A. Cain,
Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 807-08 (2008); Marjorie E. Komhauser,
Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the Persistence of the Marital Unit in the American Income
Tax, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 631 (2010); Zelenak, supra note 2, at 342.
67. See, e.g., Freck v. I.R.S., 810 F. Supp. 597 (D. Pa. 1992), vacated, 37 F.3d 986 (3d Cir.
1994) (ruling that a woman could not avoid tax liability as an "innocent spouse" after she signed tax
returns in which the man she was living with underreported their income and where the couple held
themselves out as husband and wife and filed joint tax returns but were never married in a formal
ceremony and their state of domicile did not recognize common law marriage); Lizalek v. Comm'r, 97
T.C.M. (CCH) 1639 (2009) (T.C. Memo 2009-122), available at 2009 WL 1530160 (holding a
woman not liable for taxes on one-half of her unmarried partner's income where they were "married
under the laws of God" but had no marriage certificate and their state of domicile did not recognize
common law marriage).
68. United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2008); see also 10 U.S.C. § 1477
(2006) (setting forth death benefits for military spouses); 32 C.F.R. § 716.4 (2011) (first-in-line
eligible survivor for military death gratuity is a spouse who is "legally married to the member at the
time of the member's death").
69. Dedman, 527 F.3d at 582-83.
70. Id.
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of the husband, Watson, and the adoptive mother of the wife, Holland) for
making false claims for Watson's pension benefits on her daughter's behalf.71
The marriage, however, would have been valid in the majority of states, which
do not prohibit marriage based on adoptive relationships. That the marriage
occurred in Arkansas, then, was "bad luck" according to the court.72 The court
even noted that so long as the underlying marriage was valid, "any person with
nothing but the worst motives could enter into a marriage ... and qualify" for
benefits without violating the law.
73
While formal marriage tests have the benefit of simple administration,
they may actually incentivize instrumental marriages. Take, for example, laws
concerning eligibility for health insurance.74 Courts have upheld convictions for
insurance fraud and larceny where a person identified a significant other as a
"spouse" on a health insurance application.75 But people who marry only for
insurance are nevertheless entitled to it.76 In some cases, romantic couples or
friends who have been together for many years without marriage have chosen
to marry solely for health insurance coverage. 77 It is, of course, the tying of the
benefit itself-here, health insurance-to marriage that creates the incentive to
marry, not the formal rule. But the existence of the formal rule, as opposed to a
71. Id. at 582-83, 588, 603.
72. Id. at 597.
73. Id.
74. Many employers routinely provide health insurance for the spouses of employees as a
matter of custom. Michael A. Ash & M. V. Lee Badgett, Separate and Unequal: The Effect of
Unequal Access to Employment-Based Health Insurance on Same-Sex and Unmarried Different-Sex
Couples, 24 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 582 (2006). Federal law further supports these programs by
considering insurance benefits to spouses as not constituting a taxable transfer of income. Id. at 474;
I.R.C. § 105(b).
75. See, e.g., Asher v. Alkan Shelter, 212 P.3d 772 (Alaska 2009) (affirming trial court's
determination that ex-wife was liable for fraud when ex-husband represented her as his wife to his
employer in order to obtain health insurance for her and she knowingly paid husband for the
insurance); State v. Nosik, 715 A.2d 673 (Conn. 1998) (affirming trial court's decision to convict
woman of insurance fraud and larceny and sentence her to two years of incarceration and five years of
probation after she listed her "boyfriend" as a "spouse" on health insurance application and insurance
company paid out over $10,000 for the man's medical bills).
76. One insurance industry spokesman told a reporter that it is unlikely that an insurer would
deny coverage to anyone who married for insurance benefits. "I think most people would agree this
doesn't rise to the level of fraud." See Saying "I Do "for a Health Plan, UNMARRIEDAMERICA.ORG
(June 28, 2004), http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/members/news/2004/May-News/Saying. do
for_a healthplan.htm (statement of Dave Hennings, spokesman for the National Health Care Anti-
Fraud Association in Washington, D.C.).
77. The late feminist author Andrea Dworkin and her long-term companion, feminist writer
John Stoltenberg married, according to Stoltenberg, for insurance reasons due to Dworkin's poor
health. See Ariel Levy, Foreward to ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE, at xxv (twentieth anniversary
ed. 2007) (recounting Stoltenberg's statement at Dworkin's memorial service that their reasons for
marrying were practical: "[ilf Dworkin had not been his legal wife, she would not have been covered
by his health insurance, and the bills for the frequent surgeries and hospital stays that punctuated the
end of her life would have left the couple in financial ruins"); see also Saying "I Do "for a Health
Plan, supra note 76 (documenting incidents of heterosexual couples marrying for insurance purposes).
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more intrusive functional test, makes it easy to take advantage of the benefit if
it is worth it to a particular couple without inviting state scrutiny.
Formal rules usually conceive of marriage as a proxy for financial
interdependence and often as a proxy for a traditional relationship in which one
spouse-usually a woman-is dependent upon the other-usually a man.78 The
marriage bonus in tax law, for example, is given to couples who have
structured their work lives so that one of them is earning most of the money.
(The marriage penalty can be seen not as a penalty on marriage itself but as a
penalty on egalitarian marriage.) Pension benefits are made available to
spouses of wage earners either because of an assumption that the non-wage-
earning spouse contributed through homemaking to the earner's ability to work
or on a partnership theory of marriage where couples are assumed to be
financially interdependent. Health insurance benefits go to spouses because
often there is only one fully employed member of a marital couple, especially if
the couple has children.
In addition to their use as rules that regulate the granting of public
benefits, formal marriage rules can also ensure that married people do not
obtain benefits designed for single people. For example, in People v. Omar, a
woman received cash public assistance, food stamps, and Medi-Cal benefits in
the amount of $20,655 and was prosecuted for welfare fraud and perjury. 79 The
defendant had concealed her marriage to her husband, who owned a house, at
least two beauty parlors, and a boat and trailer; assets which, along with his
unreported income, would have rendered her ineligible for public assistance
benefits.8 ° In Omar, it appears that the husband was indeed supporting the wife
and that she therefore did not need welfare.
8 1
Formal tests can be under-inclusive, as even a marriage in which one
spouse refused to support the other would disqualify the otherwise eligible
spouse. The remedy for the needy spouse in such a case would be divorce,
followed by an application for benefits, not a claim that the marriage was not
61 82
"really" a marriage. And in some cases, these rules incentivize the parties not
to marry at all. In these cases, marriage still functions as a proxy for financial
78. For a discussion of the gendered origins of these rules, see infra Subsection II.A. 1.
79. People v. Omar, No. F039137, 2002 WL 1943501 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2002) (imposing
a three-year sentence, permanently disqualifying defendant from receiving cash public assistance
benefits and disqualifying her from receiving food stamp benefits for one year); see also State v.
Martin, 616 P.2d 193 (Haw. 1980) (upholding conviction of woman who wrongfully obtained public
assistance monies exceeding two hundred dollars by deception as to her marital status and the
employment earnings of herself and her husband).
80. Omar, 2002 WL 1943501 at *1.
81. Id.
82. Social security law, in some cases, creates an incentive for couples not to marry. If one
member of a couple contemplating marriage was married before, she will lose the right to 50 percent
of the value of her ex-spouse's social security payments on retirement if she remarries, and may never
recoup the benefit through her new marriage. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(H), (c)(1)(C),
(c)(1)(H) (2006).
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interdependence, and fraud occurs when the person seeking benefits has
concealed the existence of a breadwinning spouse.
B. "Marriage-Plus" Tests
Most bright-line rules start with a formal requirement of a marriage
certificate; some, like the ones described above, stop there. Others add further
layers, including temporal, age, procreative, or cohabitation requirements.
These rules all share with formal marriage-only rules a preference for bright-
line clarity regarding eligibility, but differ from those rules in their anxiety that
a simple marriage certificate may be insufficient to ensure that the types of
marriages that privileged by the benefit are the types the legislature wants to
favor.
1. Temporal Requirements
In some areas of law, legislatures have determined that the easiest way to
prevent fraud is simply to create a temporal requirement. If a marriage has not
lasted for a specified period of time, then the spouses will not be eligible for
benefits based on the marriage. For example, to be eligible to receive veteran's
death benefits a surviving spouse must have been married to a military veteran
83for at least one year immediately before the pensioner's death. Thus, in the
Dedman case discussed earlier, had the marriage between adoptive grandfather
and granddaughter been valid, it would have qualified under this test because
they had been married for more than one year when the grandfather died and
his wife gained access to his pension. 84 Social security law uses a similar
scheme: a couple must be married for at least nine months before one of them
becomes eligible to receive the other's social security benefits in the event of
his or her death.8 5 In a constitutional challenge to the social security rule, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that it might sometimes be overbroad, excluding
legitimate claimants in order to discourage sham relationships, but upheld the
rule under rational basis review.86 The Court reasoned that while some worthy
individuals would be excluded from benefits, the efficiency that would be
afforded to numerous other claimants, protecting them from "uncertainties and
delays" and obviating the "necessity for large numbers of individualized
determinations," more than compensated for the minor social cost.87
83. United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating in dicta that court would not
entertain a sham marriage claim because the rule preventing fraudulent marriage was a time-based rule
and nothing in the statute referred to parties' intent).
84. 1d.
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(1)(e), (g)(1)(e) (2004).
86. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 782 (1975).
87. Id. at 783; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1055(4) (2006) (allowing employer pension plans governed
by ERISA to limit definition of spouse to those who have been married throughout the one-year period
immediately before the participant's annuity starting date or death).
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Another kind of temporal rule evaluates the value of a marriage, post-
divorce, by its length. To be eligible for death-related social security benefits, a
divorced person must demonstrate that the marriage upon which the benefits
are based lasted at least ten years and that the surviving spouse remained
unmarried following the divorce. 88 This eligibility rule can be construed as an
antifraud measure that prevents people who, without the time limits, might
game the system and collect social security benefits from multiple former
spouses, or marry someone on his deathbed solely for his benefits. Here, a
formal marriage requirement standing alone functions as a proxy for financial
dependence; the addition of a time requirement functions as a proxy for
commitment and relative exclusivity. It rewards the traditional gendered
division of labor and an antiquated notion of fidelity, awarding benefits to
spouses who were dependent on traditional breadwinners during long-term
marriages and, by not remarrying, presumably remained dependent and chaste
between divorce and the partner's death.
2. Age Rules
A less common method for preventing marriage fraud is an age require-
ment. New Jersey, for example, has an unusual age-based rule for determining
whether surviving spouses of certain government employees can receive
widow's benefits. Under the New Jersey statute, a "surviving spouse" is a
person who married the employee "prior to the time when such employee
reached the age of 50 years." 89 The statute then further limits the availability of
benefits by stating that "[n]o such surviving spouse shall be eligible for any
benefit hereunder who was or shall be more than 15 years younger than the
employee at the time of their marriage." 90 Thus, the statute views with
suspicion marriages of people over fifty, or marriages between people with
significant age gaps. In successfully defending the statute against a constitu-
tional challenge, New Jersey argued that the law had been designed to respond
to "trouble with 'death bed marriages[,]' which necessitated the paying out of
benefits... for substantial periods beyond those reasonably calculated from
actuarial tables." 9' The state needed to develop a system "to prevent fraud by
insuring that benefits inure[d] only to those wives who truly qualiftied] as bona
fide widows, thereby denying benefits to bogus widows." 92 Applying rational
basis review, the court determined that even if the statute resulted in
88. Collins, supra note 4, at 1166.
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:10-18.64(h) (1991).
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:10-18.50. The trial court opinion in Lewis v. Harris, a recent case in
which same-sex couples sued for the right to marry in New Jersey, cited Reiser v. Pension Comm 'n of
Passaic, 370 A.2d 902 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), for the proposition that "courts will not
second-guess the Legislature's policy decisions regarding economic, social and philosophical issues."
No. MER-L- 15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003).
91. Reiser, 370 A.2d at912.
92. Id.
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eliminating some bona fide widows from the pension scheme, it was enough
that there was an "evil at hand for correction" and that the law was a rational
way to correct it.
9 3
Here, marriage once again functions as a proxy for dependency and age
steps in as a proxy for long-term commitment. Laws such as New Jersey's pre-
sume that parties who enter into marriages with rartners over fifty or more than
fifteen years their senior invest less in their relationships, and are therefore less
worthy of spousal benefits, than their counterparts in age-similar relationships.
3. Procreation Rules
Some legal schemes use children as a proxy for a valid marriage. In social
security law, for example, there is an exception to the rule that a couple must be
married at least nine months before one of them can receive benefits based on
the death of the other. If the surviving spouse is the parent of the deceased
spouse's child, if he or she adopted a child with the deceased spouse, or if
either spouse adopted the other's child, then the surviving spouse qualifies for
benefits regardless of the length of the marriage. 94 These rules assume a close
link between marriage and procreation: people who have taken on legal
obligations to the same child are more likely to also have made a bona fide
commitment to each other. Here, the child substitutes for time, which serves as
a proxy for long-term commitment, or perhaps the child is itself evidence of the
existence of a conjugal family.
4. Cohabitation Rules
In addition, some legal doctrines use cohabitation in addition to marriage
as a means of determining whether a marriage is legally valid. For example, a
Minnesota statute requires a spouse of a state employee to be residing with him
at the time of his death to be eligible for his pension benefits. The legislature
appears to have been motivated by a desire to both provide "an incentive for
spouses to stay with and care for the pensioner" and to "prevent sham
marriages." 95 Here, cohabitation is a proxy for commitment; the law assumes
that cohabiting solely for a pension will be difficult to keep up. Similarly,
93. Id. at 190, 914.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 416(a)(2) (2006) (defining "surviving spouse"); § 416(c)(1) (defining
"widow"); § 416(g)(1) (defining "widower"). Federal regulations add a requirement that a child born
to the marriage be the "natural" child of both parents. 20 C.F.R. § 404.335 (2011).
95. Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass'n, 615 N.W.2d 66, 75-76 (Minn. 2000). Both the
New Jersey statute discussed in Reiser, see supra note 91, and the Minnesota statute discussed in Scott
involved government-run pension plans and cited the stability of public finances and the threat of sham
marriages as justification for statutory eligibility requirements. The lack of case law concerning
inquiries into the validity of a marriage in the insurance and private pension-plan context may be
explained by the possibility that private entities administering insurance or pension plans simply
"price-in" the cost of dealing with sham marriages into all issued policies.
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federal tax law uses a formal rule for marriage but makes an exception for some
married couples who do not cohabit.
96
5. Different Sex Rules
Under the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the word "marriage" means
"only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,"
and the word "spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife. 97 As a result, anyone seeking a federal benefit based on a
same-sex marriage will be denied the benefit regardless of the validity of the
marriage. 98 This will be true even if a marriage is recognized by the state where
it was celebrated. Because same-sex marriage is now available 99  or
recognized °0 in a variety of jurisdictions, conflicts between some states'
recognition of marriage and the lack of federal recognition are growing. 01 The
96. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7703-1(b) (setting forth requirements for "married individuals living apart"
to include the maintenance of a separate household for more than half of the taxable year and the
presence of a dependent child in the household).
97. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (federal definition of"spouse"). But see I.R.S. PUBLICATION 17, at 5 (2010)
(giving registered domestic partners and married same-sex couples living in community property
states-California, Nevada, and Washington-the option of filing separately and splitting income); see
also Scott James, For Same-Sex Couples, a Tax Victory that Doesn't Feel Like One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2011, at A2IA (discussing problems with new IRS rule).
98. Over a thousand such benefits have been identified. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23,
2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
99. As of October 7, 2011, the following states offer same-sex marriage: Connecticut, Iowa,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont, as well as the District of Columbia.
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2010);
Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a (2009); Marriage Equality Act, A8354-201 1, available
at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/A8354-201 1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 8 (2009). In addition,
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, and Mexico offer country-wide same-sex marriage. Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentina Approves
Gay Marriage in a First for Region, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A3 (Argentina, Portugal, Iceland);
Dan Levin, Awaiting a Full Embrace of Same-Sex Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at A9 (South
Africa); Rachel Donadio, Pope Takes Aim at Abortion and Gay Marriage in Portugal, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14,2010, at A6 (Norway, Sweden); World Briefing Americas: Canada: Gay Marriage Approved,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A6 (Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain); David Agren, Court
Says All Mexican States Must Honor Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A6 (Mexico).
100. New Mexico and Maryland recognize same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. Opinion
of Gary K. King, Att'y Gen. (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.nmag.gov/Opinions/
Opinion.aspx?OpID=1131 (opining that New Mexico would likely recognize a same-sex marriage
performed elsewhere); Opinion of Douglas F. Gansler, Att'y Gen. (Feb. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf) (Maryland). Additionally, New Jersey
recognizes same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions as civil unions. Opinion of Stuart
Rabner, Att'y Gen. (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/ag-formal-
opinion-2.16.07.pdf. See also Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2008)
(recognizing Canadian same-sex marriage).
101. See, e.g., M.V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Value of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 58
DRAKE L. REv. 1081 (2010) (listing and analyzing value of benefits that same-sex couples are denied
due to lack of federal recognition); Patricia Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-
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element in marriage for which the different-sex requirement acts as a proxy is
unclear; perhaps insistence on the different-sex requirement demonstrates
anxiety that relationships that do not follow traditional gender stereotypes are
not dependency relationships, or perhaps the requirement is a proxy for a
conjugal family, even though many heterosexual married couples do not ever
have children, and many gay couples do.'
0 2
6. "Divorce-Plus "Rules
Sometimes, the law provides an incentive to divorce rather than to marry.
In circumstances where divorce can create eligibility for a benefit, lawmakers
have developed divorce fraud doctrines. Many of these function in a similar
way as "marriage-plus" rules, with divorce substituting for marriage. In these
cases, the court must determine first whether a valid divorce exists and, second,
examine some other evidence that is considered dispositive of whether the
divorce is "real." One example of this kind of rule in action is the test for
divorce fraud in federal income tax law. Just as some people claim married
status to obtain a tax marriage bonus, other couples claim unmarried status to
avoid a marriage penalty. Similarly, low-income taxpayers eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) can suffer a marriage penalty and therefore
have an incentive to divorce. 1
03
KENT L. REV. 481 (2009). As this Article went to press, the future of DOMA is uncertain. In February
of 2011, the Obama Administration announced that it would cease to enforce DOMA because of its
belief that the statute is unconstitutional. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y Gen., to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Letter to Congress on Litigation Involving the
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/l 1-ag-223.html. In several cases challenging the constitutionality of DOMA, the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives is defending the statute because the
Administration will not defend it. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor-
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Windsor v. United States, No.
10-CV-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 1, 2011), available at http://docs.justia.corm/cases/federal/district-
courts/new-york/nysdce/ 1:2010cv08435/370870/50 (defending DOMA against a challenge where
DOMA caused surviving spouse to be subject to estate tax where a federally-recognized marriage
would incur no estate tax). In some of the cases, the Department of Justice has gone beyond refusing to
defend DOMA and filed briefs arguing affirmatively that DOMA is unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Golinski v. United States, No. 10-CV-00257
(N.D. Ca.) (July 1, 2011), available at http://metroweekly.con/poliglotDOJ-OppToBLAG MtD.pdf
(arguing that DOMA unconstitutionally discriminates against gays and lesbians by denying otherwise
eligible individuals access to Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan).
102. These justifications have been offered by states defending their own "mini-DOMAs" in
constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass.
2003) (rejecting state's rationale that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers Legislature's
interest in conserving scarce resources because "same-sex couples are more financially independent
than married couples"); Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that state has a
rational basis for denying marriage to same-sex couples because they cannot accidentally reproduce).
103. Alstott, Earned Income, supra note 2, at 560-64 (describing how the EITC creates
disincentives to marry and incentives to divorce and providing examples .of how the EITC marriage
penalty interacts with federal income tax marriage bonuses and penalties).
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The most famous case of tax divorce fraud is Boyter v. Commissioner.10 4
There, a couple, after realizing they were subject to a marriage penalty, traveled
to Haiti in December of 1975 to obtain a divorce decree so that they could file
separate tax returns. 10 5 They promptly remarried in January 1976 and repeated
the process the following year with a divorce from the Dominican Republic
followed by a prompt remarriage. The couple continued to live together in the
same home, and in court the wife testified that they obtained the divorce solely
to avoid the marriage penalty.' °6 The New York Times discussed their scheme
in four separate articles in 1980 and 1981.107 The Boyters framed their
litigation as a principled battle against unjust tax laws: "[f]rom the Boyter's
perspective-as well as that of millions of other families with two
breadwinners-the reform needed is self-evident: tax law should be blind to
how couples choose to live, neither encouraging nor discouraging marriage."
' 0 8
The courts were not as sympathetic as the Times. The Tax Court held that
since the determination of marital status must be made in accordance with state
law, and it would not recognize the foreign divorce decrees as valid to
terminate petitioners' marriage under Maryland law because at all times
petitioners remained domiciled in Maryland. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
found that although the determination of marital status must be made in
accordance with state law, the IRS had another tool it could use to attack the
validity of the divorce: the "sham transaction doctrine" that tax courts had
developed in other contexts.'
109
Under the sham transaction doctrine, a corporation may not transfer assets
to a shell corporation that the corporation created solely to receive assets for tax
purposes and then dissolved. 1° Instead, the corporation must have some
independent valid business purpose for creating the second corporation.1" In
Boyter, the Fourth Circuit extended the sham transaction doctrine to apply to
divorce, holding that if the underlying purpose of the divorce was to enable
"the taxpayers to remain effectively married while avoiding the marriage
penalty" then the "the prompt remarriage... defeats the apparent divorce when
assessing the taxpayers' liability." 1 2 The court compared the speedy
remarriage with a "prompt reincorporation of a business enterprise in
104. Boyter v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 989 (1980).
105. Boyterv. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1383-84(4th Cir. 1981).
106. Id. at 1384.
107. Couple Who Divorced to Cut Taxes Ordered to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1980, at
A16; The Marriage Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1980, at 20; Richard Haitch, Follow-Up On the
News: Tax Split, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1981, at 49; Deborah Rankin, Filing Status: Key Factor in
Determining Tax Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1981, at D1.
108. The Marriage Penalty, supra note 107, at 20.
109. Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1387.
110. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
111. Id
112. Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1387.
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continuous operation."' 3 Under the "sham transaction doctrine," the
remarriage, just like the reincorporation, would "defeat the apparent liquidation
of the predecessor" marriage.1
1 4
Although the IRS attempted to use Boyter in several subsequent cases that
dealt with divorces allegedly entered into to lessen tax liability, courts have
sided with the IRS only in cases where the couple remarried after the tax-
incentivized divorce. In cases where the couple remains divorced, the sham
transaction rationale is not available. For example, in U.S. v. Taylor, the
government sought to satisfy a tax lien against a man by going after his pension
plan-90 percent of which was transferred to his ex-wife in their divorce
proceedings-by contending that the man had obtained a sham divorce in order
to shield his assets.' 15 The court distinguished Boyter, noting that while the
couple remarried in that case, in the present situation the couple remained
divorced." 6 Thus, the test that appears to operate in the tax context is a
"divorce-plus" test: we know that a divorce is fraudulent if it is followed by the
"plus" of remarriage.
As with the marriage fraud cases, cases alleging divorce fraud usually use
marriage as a proxy for financial dependence and long-term commitment;
divorce is a proxy for the opposite. A divorce followed by a remarriage, then, is
assumed to show that a committed relationship involving financial dependence
still exists. A recent lawsuit tested this theory in the private sector. Continental
Airlines sued several of its pilots for divorcing their spouses in order to obtain
payouts of their pension benefits before they retired. According to the
complaint, Continental provides generous pension benefits that can total up to
$900,000 per individual, paid in a lump sum on retirement. 117 Under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), however, a recipient of
the pension benefits could assign his or her benefits to an ex-spouse in the
event of a divorce through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.' 8
Continental alleged that the pilots all obtained divorces from their spouses,
assigned all or nearly all of the pension benefits as lump sum cash payments to
their now ex-spouses, but had "no intention of disassociating as marital
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. No. CIV. 396335, 2001 WL 1636505 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2001).
116. Id. at *6; see also In re Freytag, No. 390-30082-HCA-7, 1993 WL 471317 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Aug. 12, 1993) (refusing to find divorce a sham because although the wife testified she had
obtained a divorce as quickly as she did for tax liability reasons, she also testified that she had
previously contemplated divorce, and the couple lived in separate residences since shortly after the
divorce).
117. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint and Application for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10,
Cont'l Pilots Ret. Plan Admin. Comm. v. Brown, 4:09-CV-01529 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2009)
[hereinafter Complaint, Continental v. Brown].
118. Brown v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. 10-20015 (5th Cir. July 18, 2011), available at
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/10/10-20015-CVO.wpd.pdf.
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partners.""l9 Indeed, after the plans' funds had been distributed, the pilots and
their spouses remarried, usually within a few months.1 20 The Fifth Circuit rejec-
ted Continental's attempt to apply a "divorce-plus" analysis to determining the
validity of the pension claims, finding no authority to support the notion that a
plan administrator has the authority to "engage in complex determinations or
underlying motives or intent."'12 1 The court further refused to apply the Boyter
sham transaction doctrine to the case, reasoning that there is "a significant
difference between allowing federal tribunals such as the tax, bankruptcy, and
immigration courts to consider whether a divorce is a sham, and authorizing a
private entity such as Continental to make such a determination, which would
involve independently investigating employees' private lives in order to judge
the genuineness of the intentions behind their divorces."'
' 2 2
C. Functional Marriage Tests
At the other end of the spectrum from bright-line rules requiring only proof
of marriage are functional tests. Here, proof of a valid marriage is irrelevant.
What matters is whether a couple is acting married. Are they, for example,
sharing expenses? Living in the same home? Do they have children together
whom they co-parent? Do they perform household services for each other?
Functional marriage tests are nothing new in family law. In fact, state
family law in the nineteenth century very frequently recognized "common law
marriage," that is, marriage without a ceremony. A common law marriage
generally existed where a couple agreed to be married, cohabited, and held
themselves out to their community as husband and wife. 12 3 Traditionally, courts
widely recognized common law marriage as a method of bringing
nonconforming relationships within the ambit of the marital ideal.
2 4
Recognizing a couple as married even without a ceremony or license, for
example, prevented women who were abandoned by their partners or widowed
from relying on the public fisc for their support. 125 Recognition of common law
marriage also prevented children born to these relationships from suffering the
stigma and legal disabilities of illegitimacy. 126
119. Complaint, Continental v. Brown, supra note 117, at 8.
120. Id. at 13.
121. Brown v. Continental, No. 10-20015, slip op. at 9.
122. Id.
123. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 10 (2009); Taylor v. Taylor, 298 N.Y.S. 912, 914 (N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1937); Proctor v. Foster, 230 P. 753, 754 (Okla. 1924); McChesney v. Johnson, 79 S.W.2d 658,
659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
124. Aricla R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 957, 968 (2000).
125. Id. at969.
126. See Rodebaugh v. Sanks, 2 Watts 9, 11 (Pa. 1883) (stating that if courts were to require
marriage ceremonies they would "bastardize a vast majority of the children which have been bom
within the state for half a century").
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The demise of common law marriage in the majority of the states 127
occurred at least in part out of a concern that recognizing marriages that had
not been formally solemnized encouraged fraud. 128 Some commentators have
argued that limitation of marriage to formal, ceremonial marriage serves the
same purpose as the Statute of Frauds does "in requiring certain important
agreements to be written."' 29 Legal historian Ariela Dubler has noted that
common law marriage came under particularly vociferous attack during the
1930s. 130 She attributes this largely to anxiety over women's newly acquired
political power and demonstrates that lawmakers shifted their view of women
claiming common law marriage from "weak and dependent, the potential
victims of unscrupulous men" to "deceitful and conniving.., powerful and
crafty, prey[ing] mercilessly on the weakness and vulnerability of
unsuspecting men."'
131
Her observations about the demise of common law marriage fit well with
this Article's argument about the rise of public benefits. If the "carrots"
attached to marriage increase, we might see heightened anxiety about the ease
with which one could marry. Cracking down on common law marriage would
be one way to prevent those who were not "really" married from claiming to be
married. In addition, if legal marriage is the only protected space for sexual
expression and procreation, we would expect recognition of functional
marriage. In contrast, once cohabitation becomes socially and legally
acceptable without marriage, the existence of common law marriage becomes a
problem. How can we know that someone intended to marry, simply because
they acted married, when people act married all the time?
32
Although most states no longer recognize common law marriage, the use
of functional marriage tests to prevent fraud is quite common. There is an
important difference between the two types of functional marriage. A common
law marriage is a marriage, for all purposes. There simply was no ceremony.
Therefore, a common law spouse can get divorced, inherit under intestate
127. Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, and Utah currently recognize common law marriage. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXTS, MATERIALS 133 (5th ed. 2010).
128. See, e.g., People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987) (holding public acknowledgment
of marriage necessary to guard against fraudulent claims); Anderson v. Anderson, 131 N.E.2d 301,
304-05 (Ind. 1956) (noting that common law marriages are a "fruitful source of perjury and fraud" and
therefore are "merely tolerated and not encouraged"). For an argument that the concerns about fraud
were overblown and that the common law marriage test was effective in distinguishing between
meritorious and unmeritorious claims, see Cynthia Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back
Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 733-34, 50-51 (1996).
129. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW, supra note 127, at 132.
130. See Dubler, supra note 125, at 996-98.
131. Id.
132. For proposals to resurrect common law marriage, see Bowman, supra note 128; Sonya
Garza, Common Law Marriage: A Proposal for the Revival of a Dying Doctrine, 40 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 541 (2006); Charlotte Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of
Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483 (2007).
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succession laws, and enjoy hospital visitation rights, tax breaks, and all of the
other benefits and burdens of marriage.' 33 In contrast, a "marriage" for
purposes of functional marriage fraud tests will not necessarily be a marriage
for all purposes. It will simply deem a couple "married" for the purpose of
qualifying-or disqualifying-them from a particular benefit. For example,
spouses who cannot establish a valid marriage in order to obtain social security
retirement benefits may be "deemed" to be married if they "went through a
marriage ceremony ... that would have resulted in a valid marriage except for
a legal impediment" and did so "in good faith."'13 4 This rule prevents those who
believed themselves to be married and acted as if they were getting married
from being denied benefits.' 
35
However, the most notorious of the functional marriage fraud tests
disqualified unmarried people for benefits by construing them to be married.
The "man-in-the-house" rules common in state welfare law during the 1960s
deemed a man's income to be available to the children of a woman with whom
he cohabited, even if he was not actually supporting her children. As a result,
the children become ineligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) benefits. 136
Some states stretched this rule quite far. Alabama, for example,
considered a man to be a "substitute father" for dependent children if he
"cohabited" with their mother. "Cohabit" was a euphemism for having sexual
relations with her at any time, not a requirement that the man and woman live
in the same house. 137 The Warren Court struck this statute down in the 1968
decision King v. Smith. 138 In King, Mrs. Sylvester Smith, who had four children
receiving AFDC benefits, challenged the statute. She had an intimate
133. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW, supra note 127, at 131-32.
134. 20 C.F.R. § 404.346 (2011).
135. See also 20 C.F.R. §222.14 (stating that for eligibility under the Railroad-Retirement Act,
a person may be deemed to be a spouse where there is no valid marriage if the claimant went through
the marriage ceremony in good faith and was living in the same household as the employee when he or
she applied for the spousal annuity or when the employee died). These tests resemble the common law
"putative spouse doctrine," whereby a person who has cohabited with another person in the good faith
belief that he or she was married is a putative spouse until knowledge of the impediment to a valid
marriage is made known to the person. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 18, at 254-58 (discussing
putative spouse doctrine).
136. See St. John Barrett, New Role of the Courts in Developing Public Welfare Law, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (describing state "man-in-house" laws and identifying a "common element relating to
the sexual misconduct of the mother, varying emphasis was placed on the character of the home
environment, the presence of an adult male as a source of income, and the immorality of the mother as
reasons for denying aid").
137. According to the Alabama statute, an "able-bodied man, married or single, is considered a
substitute father of all the children of the applicant mother" in three different situations: (1) if "he lives
in the home with the child's natural or adoptive mother for the purpose of cohabitation"; or (2) if "he
visits (the home) frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the child's natural or adoptive mother";
or (3) if "he does not frequent the home but cohabits with the child's natural or adoptive mother
elsewhere." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313-14 (1968).
138. Id.
[Vol. 100:1
MRRIAGE FRAUD
relationship with a Mr. Williams, a married man with nine children of his own.
As a result of that relationship, Alabama cut off the Smith children's
benefits. 139 Following the King ruling, courts struck down other, less extreme
man-in-the-house laws, and welfare law went from using a functional marriage
rule to a formal marriage rule.
140
More recently, Utah has redefined marriage in an attempt to punish and
deter women from seeking welfare when they have functional husbands. 4 1 The
state became concerned about fundamentalist Mormons who were living in
polygamous relationships. 142 The husband would be legally married to his first
wife, but-in order to avoid a bigamy prosecution-not married to his other
wives. 143 Nevertheless, the husband and his nonlegal wife would "share a
home, raise a family, and hold themselves out to the community as man and
wife."' 44 This enabled a woman in a polygamous marriage to "claim that she
was a single mother and qualify for the accordant welfare benefits, all the while
enjoying the benefits of living with her income-earning partner in the
unofficial, quasi-marital relationship.' 4 5 In response, Utah passed a statute that
essentially codified common law marriage in Utah, even though most states
have repealed their common law marriage statutes.146 The statute allows courts
to order that an unsolemnized marriage is a legal and valid marriage so long as
the relationship is between a man and a woman who are capable of giving
consent and marrying, who have cohabited, who have mutually assumed
marital rights, duties, and obligations, and who have held themselves out as
husband and wife. 147 The express purpose of the law, according to its sponsor,
was to "preclud[e] these couples from taking advantage of the state welfare
system in this fraudulent manner.'
' 48
139. Id. at 314.
140. Note, however, that the Supreme Court did not go so far as to say that states had to
determine whether a family living in the same home was pooling income to deny children welfare
benefits. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (holding Congress acted rationally in
requiring all children in the same household to be counted in the household unit for AFDC purposes,
even if a child receives support from a noncustodial parent); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986)
(holding Congress had a rational basis for classifying parents, children, and siblings who live together
as a single household for food stamps eligibility).
141. Tenney, supranote 15, at 148.
142. Id.
143. Id at 144-45.
144. See id. at 148-49 (summarizing Senator Stephen Reese's introduction of the bill as its
sponsor on the floor of the Utah Senate).
145. Id. at 148.
146. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (2007); see also CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED
COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (2010) (noting that twenty-three states abolished common
law marriage between 1875 and 2009).
147. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5; Tenney, supra note 15, at 146 n.26.
148. Tenney, supra note 15, at 149; see also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006)
(upholding constitutionality of Utah statute in light of Lawrence v. Texas); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820
(Utah 2004) (allowing unsolemnized and unlicensed marriage to serve as a predicate marriage for
purposes of a bigamy prosecution).
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Functional tests, then, can be used to treat a couple as married-even
when they are not formally married-in order to deny the couple benefits. Like
the divorce-plus rules, functional marriage fraud tests often prevent couples
from disclaiming marital relationships. With these tests, marriage once again
acts as a proxy for economic dependence, and the functional aspects of
marriage--often, cohabitation-act in turn as proxies for marriage. The tests
then assume that a cohabiting couple (or, as with the Alabama statute struck
down in King, a couple involved in a sexual relationship regardless of their
living arrangements) is an economically interdependent couple.
D. Integrated Tests
Instead of using a purely formal, a marriage-plus, or a purely functional
test, some legal doctrines take a "boot and suspenders" approach that integrates
all three types. Lawmakers use combination tests when anxiety about marriage
fraud is at its height-when the incentives to marry significantly outweigh the
burdens of entry and exit. The requirement of a formal marriage prevents the
nonmarried from claiming a functional marriage and potentially defrauding the
government. At the same time, requiring formally married people to also
demonstrate a "plus" factor and a functional marriage limits the number of even
formally married people who can obtain benefits.
Immigration law is the most extensive and complex area of law that uses
an integrated approach to determine marriage fraud. Federal law provides for
the deportation of immigrants who commit immigration marriage fraud and
criminal penalties for both immigrants and citizens who participate in
fraudulent marriages. 149 First, all immigrants attempting to obtain legal status
through marriage must demonstrate a bona fide marriage. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) uses the familiar lex loci rule to determine whether a
marriage is valid: it will recognize a marriage as valid in the jurisdiction where
it was celebrated, unless doing so would be contrary to strong policy of the
jurisdiction recognizing the marriage.150
149. See Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)
(2006) (immigrant is deportable if she procured a visa or other documentation based on a marriage
entered into less than two years prior to admission which was judicially annulled or terminated unless
the immigrant establishes that the marriage was not contracted for the purpose of evading any
provisions of the immigration laws); INA §275(c) ("Any individual who knowingly enters into a
marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not
more than 5 years, or fined not more than $250,000, or both."). Cf INA § 212 (a)(6)(C) (immigrant is
inadmissible if she seeks to procure a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States by
fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact). As a practical matter, in many cases a finding of
marriage fraud would also make an immigrant deportable even absent these provisions because it
would remove the immigrant's only legal basis for presence in the United States.
150. See In re Hoefflin, 15 I. & N. Dec. 31 (B.I.A. 1974) (holding that where the state law did
not recognize petitioner's "mail-order" Mexican divorce, his marriage to the beneficiary was not valid
for the purpose of conferring a preference classification on his spouse). Common law marriages are
recognized, but only if they truly are equivalent to ceremonial marriage. See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
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Immigration law then adds some "plus" rules onto the formal marriage
requirement. For instance, some jurisdictions (including Montana) recognize
proxy marriages that are solemnized without both spouses present.15" ' For
immigration purposes, however, a proxy marriage is invalid unless it has been
consummated. 152 Thus, in a 1950 case before the Board of Immigration
Appeals, an Italian proxy marriage was held to be insufficient to grant
immigration status to an Italian woman where the marriage had not been
consummated, even though the couple entered into the proxy marriage because
the woman was pregnant with the man's child. 5 3 Immigration law also does
not recognize polygamous marriage, even if the marriage is valid where
celebrated.' 54 Furthermore, as discussed previously, under DOMA, same-sex
couples that marry are not eligible for immigration benefits, even if the
jurisdiction where the couple celebrated their marriage recognizes the marriage
as valid.'
55
The most far-reaching "plus" requirement in immigration law was
adopted in 1986 as part of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
(IMFA). The IMFA restricts green cards based on marriage to immigrants
whose marriages are at least two years old at the time the green card is
granted. 56 Immigrants whose marriages are less than two years old instead
receive only "conditional permanent residency" instead of "permanent
residency."' 157 In order to become an actual permanent resident, the immigrant
and the sponsoring spouse must jointly petition to remove the conditional
element of the immigrant's residency status after the end of an additional two-
year waiting period.' 58 Otherwise, the federal government will terminate the
temporary residency status and the immigrant spouse will be deportable.
159
Congress enacted this rule to deter individuals from marrying solely to obtain
green cards. 16° We can infer that Congress reasoned that couples that had
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 40.1 n.1.2: Cohabitation ("In the absence of a marriage certificate, ... a
common law marriage or cohabitation is considered to be a 'valid marriage' . . . only if... [t]he
relationship can only be terminated by divorce.").
151. MONT. CODEANN. § 40-1-301 (2009).
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2011).
153. In re W-, 41. & N. Dec. 209 (B.I.A. 1950).
154. An immigrant who is "coming to the United States to practice polygamy" is, in fact,
inadmissible as an immigrant even if he is eligible for an immigrant visa based on employment or a
nonmarital family relationship. INA § 212(a)(10)(A).
155. 1 U.S.C. § 7; see also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
prior to passage of DOMA, Congress did not intend to extend benefits to "homosexual marriages").
For an argument that Adams should not control even if DOMA is struck down or repealed, see Scott C.
Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses
in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537 (2010).
156. INA§216(g).
157. INA § 216(a)(1).
158. INA§216(c)(1).
159. INA §§ 216(a), (b), 237(a)(1)(D).
160. 132 CONG. REC. 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli); see also 132 CONG. REC.
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already been married for more than two years were less likely to have married
only for immigration benefits. Congress likely believed that applying an
additional two-year waiting period to recently married people who applied for
benefits would help to ferret out those people who married hastily with the
immigration benefits in the forefront of their minds.
IMFA then goes one step further. For immigrants whose marriages are
recent enough that they are eligible for only conditional permanent residency,
IMFA also applies a functional test in addition to the requirement of a formal
marriage. These immigrants, and their sponsoring spouses, must produce
documentary and testimonial evidence that their marriages are genuine.161 This
evidence "may" include, but "is not limited to":
(1) Documentation showing joint ownership of property;
(2) Lease showing joint tenancy of a common residence;
(3) Documentation showing commingling of financial resources;
(4) Birth certificate(s) of child(ren) bom to the petitioner and
beneficiary;
(5) Affidavits of third parties having knowledge of the bona fides of
the marital relationship; and
(6) Any other documentation which is relevant to establish that the
marriage was not entered into in order to evade the immigration laws
of the United States.'
62
In theory, no one item on this list is dispositive. 163 The law does not
require a couple to have children or open a joint bank account. But that does
not mean that the regulations do not encourage the couple to comply with a
particular vision of what an authentic marriage looks like.
27,015-17 (1986) (statements ofReps. Lungren, McCollum, and Frank).
161. Two other groups of immigrants are also subject to a "plus" or functional test. An
immigrant who receives lawful pennanent resident status based on marriage must wait five years
before sponsoring a new spouse for immigration status or show by "clear and convincing" evidence
that the prior marriage was not a sham. INA § 204(a)(2)(A). And an immigrant who marries during
deportation proceedings must reside outside the United States for two years following the marriage or
demonstrate by "clear and convincing" evidence that the marriage is not a sham. INA § 204(g); § 245
(e)(3). In theory, DHS could investigate any marriage used for immigration purposes in detail because
the granting of any visa is discretionary. However, the IMFA narrows the class of marriages that must
be investigated by focusing on those it deems most likely to involve fraud. See generally § 204(b)
(authorizing DHS to investigate visa petitions).
162. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(l)(i)(B) (for remarriage within five years of marriage-based green
card); § 204.2(a)(1)(iii)(B) (for marriage during removal proceedings); § 216.4(a)(5) (for recent
marriage). See also In re Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 766 (B.I.A. 1988) (listing evidence of bona
fides as including: "proof that the beneficiary has been listed as the petitioner's spouse on insurance
policies, property leases, income tax forms, or bank accounts, and testimony or other evidence
regarding courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence, and experiences").
163. See Surganova v. Holder, 612 F. 3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Nothing in the record
indicates that the [Immigration Judge] was using an inflexible rule under which a marriage could never
be bonafide without cohabitation. All he did was permissibly weigh the couple's living arrangement
as one of several factors supporting his ultimate conclusion.").
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In addition, evidence exists demonstrating that immigration officers do
sometimes take the suggested evidence in the regulations as literal require-
ments. A recent New York Times article told the story of an immigrant who had
opened a joint account with his wife to comply with the conditional residency
regulations listed above. The immigration officials granted him a green card but
told him that the joint account was not enough-he also needed to add his
wife's name to another account that was in his name only. His wife observed
"my mom has been married 25 years and they don't have a joint account. ' '" 64
Faced with the potential denial of their visa petition, immigrant- citizen couples
alter their behavior to conform to the ideal of marriage as suggested by the
regulations and interpreted by immigration officials.
Often, much of an applicant's file is filled with pictures of the wedding
ceremony and reception, evidence that rings were exchanged, and pictures of
the honeymoon. 6 5 Immigration examiners also ask couples questions during
their interviews with the intent of determining whether their relationships are
bona fide. Questions include: "How much is your current rent/mortgage
payment?"; "are you paid weekly, every two weeks, twice a month or monthly?
What about your spouse?"; "What is the name of your spouse's manager at
work?"; and "How much money did you receive in your last paycheck/deposit?
What about your spouse?' 66 These questions, like the regulations, assume a
shared economic life, something many couples have but many do not. Other
questions include more intimate details, such as: "Where do you keep your
clean underwear? What about your spouse?"; "Do you and your spouse use
birth control? What kind?"; and the infamous "What color is your toothbrush?
What about your spouse's?' ' 167 These questions are not required by statute or
regulation. Rather, they are questions that examiners choose to ask based on
their own subjective perceptions of the appearance of a bona fide marriage.168
164. Nina Bernstein, Do You Take this Immigrant?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 2010, at MB1. For a
critique of the regulations, see Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 3 at 1682-94.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing testimony
regarding and pictures of wedding); Nakamoto v. Ashcrott, 363 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
testimony regarding courtship and wedding ceremony as evidence of intent to establish a life together);
United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that husband and wife
used a borrowed ring); United States v. Chowdhury, 169 F.3d 402, 404 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that
none of bride's friends or family attended wedding ceremony, that the groom gave her a wedding ring
but not an engagement ring, and that there was no formal reception or honeymoon).
166. Nina Bernstein, Could Your Marriage Pass the Test?, CITY ROOM BLOG (June 11, 2010,
8:45 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/1 1/marriage-test.
167. Id.
168. For the evidence required by regulation, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(i)(B) (2011), discussed
supra note 162. The Adjudicator's Field Manual suggests asking questions during the interview that
will indicate that the couple may have entered into a marriage solely for immigration benefits,
including "large disparity of age, [i]nability of petitioner and beneficiary to speak each other's
language, [v]ast difference in cultural and ethnic background; [f]amily and/or friends unaware of the
marriage; [m]arriage arranged by a third party; [m]arriage contracted immediately following the
beneficiary's apprehension or receipt of notification to depart the United States; [d]iscrepancies in
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Like the other, less intrusive marriage fraud doctrines, the immigration
marriage fraud test uses marriage as a proxy for financial interdependency,
long-term commitment, and conjugality. The doctrine assumes that in cases
where the marriage is more than two years old that it functions as a good proxy
for these things; the temporal requirement amplifies the proxy's accuracy and
prevents the need for a more intrusive look at the marriage. With the newer
marriages, it assumes that a closer look at the marriage is needed. Joint bank
accounts and joint ownership of property are proxies for financial
interdependence; birth certificates of children are proxies for conjugality.
Affidavits of third parties and pictures of the wedding and honeymoon seem to
be proxies for long-term commitment. People who suspect their marriages will
be short-lived presumably do not engage in public ceremonies and expensive
honeymoons. Correct answers to questions about the storage of underwear or
the color of a toothbrush may be proxies for either long-term commitment or
for conjugality and intimacy. Perhaps the idea is that a person who is only
interested in the short-term benefits of marriage would not bother to notice the
details of his or her spouse's organizational habits or aesthetic preferences. Or
perhaps these questions concern items that are so intimate that only those
people actually involved in a sexual relationship would know the answers. The
Adjudicator's Field Manual suggests that examiners ask questions to elicit
"discrepancies in statements on questions for which a husband and wife should
have common knowledge," thus inviting examiners to make their own
determinations of what knowledge husbands and wives "should" have. 
169
The search for an adequate test of a marriage's validity has been
especially difficult in immigration law because of the value of the benefit.
Thus, in immigration law we see courts struggling about how to handle couples
who might not otherwise have married, or who would have not married so
soon, but for the immigration consequences. The Ninth Circuit, in a long line of
cases applying the holding of a 1953 Supreme Court decision, Lutwak v. United
States, has developed a test for ferreting out marriage fraud in immigration
cases commonly referred to as the "establish a life" test, and several other
circuits have followed suit.' Surprisingly, under the "establish a life" test, a
marriage motivated by immigration status is not fraudulent so long as the
statements on questions for which a husband and wife should have common knowledge; [n]o
cohabitation since marriage; [b]eneficiary is a friend of the family; [p]etitioner has filed previous
petitions in behalf of aliens, especially prior alien spouses." U.S. CTZENSIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL-REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION, Ch. 21.3 Petition for a
Spouse, available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/O-0-0-1/0-0-0-3481/0-O-
0-4484.html.
169. Id.
170. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953) (describing test); see also Boluk v.
Holder, 642 F.3d 297, 303-04 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying "establish a life" test); Surganova v. Holder,
612 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2005) (same);
Nakamoto, 363 F.3d at 882 (9th Cir. 2004) (reaffirming "establish a life" test); Bark v. I.N.S., 511 F.2d
1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting "establish a life" test).
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couple is willing to take on the burdens as well as the benefits of marriage-to
"establish a life" together.1 71
Thus, Ninth Circuit judges have found repeatedly that merely having a
motive to marry in order to receive immigration benefits is "at most evidence of
intent" of marriage fraud but does not itself make the marriage a sham.172 One
opinion even cited the book of Genesis for the proposition that "[m]arriages for
money or other ulterior gain are as ancient as mankind, yet may still be genuine,
and marriage fraud may be committed by one party to the marriage, or a person
who arranged the marriage, yet the other spouse may genuinely intend to
marry.' '173 The court found that an "ulterior motive of financial benefit or
immigration benefit" for marriage might be evidence of fraud, but "it does not
make the marriage a fraud.' ' 174 In that case, the court reversed and remanded a
conviction of marriage fraud where an eighteen-year-old U.S. citizen had
accepted $10,000 to marry a Filipina woman. 175 The husband had made
incriminating statements, saying, when his friends inquired about his marriage:
"it's not like for real. . . [it's] for money" and "one year before you go, you
guys gotta write letters to each other.. . and back and forth and stuff. Then
when you go to the immigration office you show 'em all the letters [and say]
that you guys fell in love and shit."'176 This evidence suggested that the husband
entered into the marriage without intent "to establish a life together" yet did not
establish that the wife lacked this intent as well. She, the court explained, might
have "intended to establish a life together at the time they were married in
gratitude for a visa."1 77 For the Ninth Circuit, a person's decision to marry for a
visa was not the problem; rather, a person's lack of intention to follow through
on the performance of the other aspects of being married-to establish a life
together-determined whether the marriage was fraudulent.
Similarly, in another case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction for
marriage fraud where the U.S. citizen wife clearly never intended a bona fide
marriage and her immigrant husband clearly wanted to marry at least in part for
171. Military benefits law has also adopted the "establish a life" test. See, e.g., United States v.
Phillips, 52 M.J. 268 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Bolden, 28 M.J. 127 (C.M.A. 1989) (affirming
conviction where airman married friend's girlfriend so that he could live off-base and paid her $250
each month of his increased allowance); United States v. Lee, 43 M.J. 794 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
1995) (affirming servicemember's sentence of a twelve-month confinement, a $5,000 fine, and a bad
conduct discharge for entering into sham marriage with a Filipina woman for immigration purposes);
United States v. Mickla, 29 M.J. 749, 751 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989) (dismissing sham marriage charge due
to speedy trial provision violation).
172. United States v. Tagalicud, 84 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996).
173. Id. ("Jacob honestly married, twice, but Laban had fraudulently caused him to marry Leah
and thereby extorted an additional seven years of work.") (citing Genesis 29:18-30).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1182 (omission in original).
177. Id. at 1185.
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a green card.178 It was conceivable, the court opined, that
while his motivation for marriage was love for a green card rather than
love for [his wife], nevertheless he planned to live with [her] as her
husband. The jury might infer that he wouldn't have been willing to
mow her lawn, clean her house, and lay her carpet without getting paid
for it, unless he saw these chores as a husband's or prospective
husband's duties.'
79
Trading a visa for the duties of marriage is acceptable under the "establish
a life" test; failing to perform marital duties is not. Thus, the government can
deport an immigrant even when a couple is having sexual relations and is
spending "two to four nights a week together" but chooses not to share an
apartment, allegedly because their duties to a granddaughter and ailing relative
and the size of the apartments precluded cohabitation. 10 Similarly, the failure
to show affection, consummate a marriage, or work to develop a relationship
with a spouse's child can be evidence of fraud.'
Several circuits have refused to adopt the "establish a life" test, and
instead use an "evade the laws" test that more closely tracks the language of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This test looks to motive, not
performance.'8 2 But the "evade the law" test turns out to be very difficult to
apply. Is marrying someone you love but would not otherwise marry if
immigration was not at stake "evading the law"? What about marrying
someone early in a relationship so that you can be together legally to pursue the
relationship and figure out whether it has long-term potential? What if the
person is someone you would never marry absent the need for a visa but are
happy to end up with if the relationship will lead to better economic
178. United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2002).
179. Id. at 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where district court
admitted Immigration and Naturalization Service officer's notes of Orellana-Blanco's interview
answers as a party admission contrary to rle against hearsay); see also Matter of Peterson, 12 I&N
Dec. 663 (B.I.A. 1968) (finding marriage valid for immigration purposes where marriage was never
consummated, husband married wife for companionship and because he "needed a housekeeper," and
husband was too aged and ill to engage in "normal marital relations"); Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422
F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing order of removal where petitioner "testified that [she and
her future husband] dated for a few months until she confided in him about the denial of her asylum
application and her pending appeal, and he, in turn, proposed because ... he expressed strong feelings
for her and could not bear the thought of losing her"). But see United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701,
710 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that jury instruction stating that "[t]he marriage is legitimate so long as
[defendant] intended to establish a life with his spouse at the time he married her, even if securing an
immigration benefit was one of the factors that led him to marry her" was a misstatement of law).
180. Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming order of removal based
on marriage fraud and noting that the Immigration Judge was "unpersuaded that the size of
Surganova's bedroom precluded Beaudion from moving in").
181. Timbreza v. Ashcroft, 98 F. App'x. 611 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds sub
noma. Timbreza v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rafiq,
116 F. App'x. 456 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Chowdhury, 169 F. 3d 402 (6th Cir.
1999).
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opportunity in the United States? If one of the spouses admits that immigration
was a factor in the decision to marry, the couple will almost certainly flunk the
"evade the law" test, even if there was intent to establish a life together.
In the majority of immigration marriage fraud cases, the specific test that
courts use likely will not affect the outcome of the case. In a case, for example,
involving a simple payment for marriage, where there is no cohabitation or
sharing of finances, the couple in question will not be able to show that they
intended to "establish a life" together or that they did not marry "for purposes
of evading the immigration laws."
But in many cases, it is difficult to tell how important the immigration
benefits were in motivating a marriage, and in these cases, the test used matters
significantly. Sometimes the "evade the law" test would fail to find
immigration fraud where the "establish a life" test would. A couple, for
example, could enter into a marriage of convenience-to legitimize a child, for
example-without intending to "evade the immigration laws of the United
States" and nevertheless flunk the "establish a life test" if they did not plan to
live together after marrying. 1
83
More commonly, however, the "evade the law" test sweeps more broadly
than the "establish a life" test. That is because a couple might be willing to
establish a life together purely, or in part, to obtain an immigration benefit, and
under the "establish a life" test, marriage in exchange for a visa is just fine.
Under the "establish a life" test, performance of marital duties, not motive in
getting married, is what matters.
Given the language of the INA and the existence of the "evade the law"
test, the persistence of the "establish a life" test seems remarkable. The Ninth
Circuit, the leader in developing this test, hears more immigration cases per
year than any other circuit. 184 The persistence of this test may indicate that
although courts can decide the easy cases with a relatively straightforward test,
not all cases are easy. People's motives in marrying are complex, varied, and
rarely straightforward. Getting at a person's motives can be very difficult.
Focusing instead on performance and willingness to engage in marital duties
may be a more predictable and objective-if fact intensive-way to adjudicate
the bona fides of a marriage.
E. A Theory of Public Benefits Fraud Tests
In each of the doctrines described above, marriage is standing in for
something else. It produces an entitlement to a benefit because lawmakers think
183. But see Marcel De Armas, For Richer or Poorer or Any Other Reason: Adjudicating
Immigration Marriage Fraud Cases Within the Scope of the Constitution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 743 (2007) (arguing that the "establish a life" test is more effective for detecting fraudulent
marriages and less likely to pose constitutional problems than the "evade the law" test).
184. See ANNAO . LAw, THE IMMIGRATION BATrLE IN AMERICAN CouRTs 153 tbl.5.1 (2010)
(showing immigration dockets for circuit courts).
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that it represents a committed, long-term, and possibly conjugal dependency
relationship that makes the recipient worthy of the benefit. In looking at the
doctrines together, a pattern emerges. When lawmakers think that marriage
alone is an adequate proxy for these attributes, they tend to use formal marriage
rules. When instead they suspect that marriage alone will not serve as an
adequate proxy, they employ "marriage-plus" rules or integrated formal-
functional tests.
Compare, for example, the formal marriage test used for health insurance
marriage fraud with the integrated test used for immigration marriage fraud.
Health insurance is prospective; no one knows when he or she might (or might
not) need it. In all but the direst circumstances, a need for health insurance is
unlikely to be the factor that tips a couple from cohabitation or friendship to
marriage. And even if this need does induce a couple to marry, the couple has
to stay together in order for the spouse to enjoy the marriage-based benefit.
Thus, the benefit-seeking spouse will remain potentially liable for the other
spouse's debts, obligated to support the spouse, and subject to equitable
distribution of property and potential alimony should a divorce occur. In many
cases, the threat of having to stay in the relationship for the long term might be
enough to deter all but the most desperate to marry. In this context, marriage
standing alone may be enough to predict long-term commitment.
In contrast, marriage to a U.S. citizen often makes the difference between
lawful immigration and no immigration at all, or, for a person who would
otherwise be eligible, the difference between a wait of a few months and a wait
185
of years or even decades.' _And exit is easy: once the government grants the
immigrant a green card, the couple is free to divorce with no consequences for
immigration status.' 86 The divorced green-card holder is every bit as much a
lawful permanent resident as the one who stays married.187 This ability to get
the benefit and then exit the relationship makes marriage in immigration law
particularly vulnerable to fraudulent use.
88
185. See INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. 1153 (2006) (setting forth quotas for family-based, employer-
sponsored, and diversity visa categories); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN Vol. IX, No. 39
(Dec. 2011) (showing wait times for visas currently being approved for various categories).
186. See INA § 237(a)(1)(D) (making deportable any alien whose conditional status is violated
by subsequent legal separation or divorce without certain hardship waivers); § 237(a)(1)(G)
(establishing rebuttable presumption that if alien's marriage terminates within two years of the grant of
conditional status, the alien entered the marriage for immigration purposes and is therefore deportable).
The rebuttable presumption of invalidity does not apply to marriages terminated after the two-year
conditional period.
187. Although the government could prosecute an immigrant for fraud where it discovers the
fraud after it grants the immigrant a green card, in these (relatively rare) cases, the remedy for the
government is rescission of the grant of lawful immigration status. See, e.g., Baria v. Leno [sic], 849 F.
Supp. 750 (D. Haw. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Baria v. Reno, 94 F.3d 1335 (9th Cir.
1996) (reviewing rescission of lawful permanent resident status based on marriage fraud after ex-wife
of immigrant contacted immigration services to report him).
188. But see Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 669, 711-12 (arguing that even short-term
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In general, if a couple is unlikely to use marriage instrumentally, either
because the benefit sought is unlikely to be substantial enough to tip the scales
toward marriage or because the benefit will cease to be useful once a party exits
the marriage, then we would not expect the state to expend its resources to
police the functional qualities of the marriage. In these cases, the government
will most likely use a formal marriage test. If on the other hand, the benefit is
substantial, and one spouse could carry the benefit with her after she exits the
marriage, the state has a much stronger interest in looking behind the mere
technical validity of the marriage to determine whether it is a relationship the
state wants to recognize. Then, the state may use plus factors or intrusive
functional tests, such as the "establish a life" test. Another way of putting it is
that when marriage is an over-inclusive proxy for an entitlement, the law steps
in to find ways to more narrowly articulate the beneficiary class so that some,
but not all, married people will benefit.
III.
MARRIAGE FRAUD AS FRAUD ON THE PUBLIC
Now that we have the panoply of marriage fraud doctrines on the table,
we can take a step back to answer the questions of "why" and "how." Why
have so many marriage fraud doctrines developed alongside the old "essentials
of the marriage" annulment doctrine? And how exactly is marriage fraud
harmful to the state? This Part first suggests three interlocking causes for the
proliferation of public benefits marriage fraud doctrines. Next, it analyzes the
harm by analogizing to modem forms of public fraud, such as securities fraud,
where the fraud causes a diffuse harm to the public rather than a harm to a
specific individual.
A. From Contract Fraud to Public Benefits Fraud
The essentials of the marriage doctrine may have focused on fraud the
parties to a marriage suffer, but this focus did not mean that the doctrine did not
implicate the public. Rather, as shown in Part I, the public had an important
interest in marriage. This interest was economic, as marriage was the primary
institution for dealing with dependency, and moral, as marriage was the official
repository for reproduction and sex. 189 Keeping spouses together in life-long,
mutually supportive relationships best served this interest. By the middle of the
twentieth century, however, the ability of private contract notions of marriage
to effectively police the public's interests was on the wane. Three develop-
ments are crucial to understanding the shift: the rise of the modem admini-
strative state, the introduction of no-fault divorce, and the decriminalization of
marriage to a stranger puts the U.S. citizen spouse at financial risk because it exposes her to a duty to
support that is still enforceable upon separation or divorce and that this risk is adequate to deter fraud).
189. See supra Part 1.
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nonmarital sex. Taken together, these factors led to a world in which a
"fraudulent" marriage could harm the public not only through the failure of
spouses to properly support each other and constrain each other's sexuality, but
also by making direct claims on the public coffers.
1. Public Benefits Linked to Marriage
The rise of the modem administrative state reconstituted the meaning of
marriage by using it as a category for eligibility for public benefits. Prior to the
New Deal and the advent of the quota system of immigration admissions,
marriage had functioned as a kind of privatized welfare system. However,
during this earlier period the system was largely internal to the couple's means.
If a woman married a man thinking he was richer than he was, she would,
unfortunately for her, not live in the style she had expected, but her
impoverished husband would still have a marital duty to support her in a
manner consistent with his station in life.190 The state was not injured by her
poverty. 191 But in the twentieth century, the meaning of marriage began to
change as the government began to tie more and more benefits to marital status.
In the 1920s, marital status became suddenly much more important
because it provided a way to evade strict immigration quotas designed to
racially regulate the growth of the nation. 192 Marital status had always been
important for Asian immigrant women, who were deemed to be likely
prostitutes or excluded laborers absent marriage to an admissible husband.1
93
Marital status had also been important for female immigrants in general, for
without a male breadwinner, a female immigrant was often considered "likely
to become a public charge," and excluded at the port of entry.' 94 The onset of
190. Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Reconsidering the Duty of Support and
Services, 15 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 8-12 (2003).
191. The main exception proves the rule: in the case of military pensions for widows of
veterans, which were made available to women throughout the nineteenth century, administrative
decision makers developed much narrower definitions of marriage than judges applying the common
law, and developed fraud doctrines in order to protect the public fisc. See Collins, supra note 4, at
1118-40.
192. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 17-21 (2004) (discussing introduction of race-based quotas); Kerry Abrams,
Peaceful Penetration: Proxy Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage, and Recognition, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV.
141, 154-64 (discussing how marriage allowed a way around the quotas for immigrant women).
193. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of lmmigration Law,
105 COLuM. L. REV. 641, 699-702 (2005) (showing how the Page Law of 1875 was used to exclude
Chinese women who did not conform to notions of proper marriage); Todd Stevens, Tender Ties:
Husbands' Rights and Racial Exclusion in Chinese Marriage Cases, 1892-1924, 27 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 271 (2002) (showing that courts interpreted the Chinese Exclusion Act to permit wives to
enter if they were joining husbands because it would be unthinkable for a man to not be entitled to the
services and companionship of his wife).
194. See MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND
CITIZENSHIP: 1870-1965, at 87-92 (2009) (discussing effects of public charge designation on
unmarried female immigrants).
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quotas for European immigrants forced Congress to confront the issue of what
status it should give to immigrants who married U.S. citizens or legal
immigrants. In its 1921 Emergency Quota Act, Congress made children of U.S.
citizens under the age of eighteen exempt from the quotas, and gave
"preference" to "wives, parents, brothers, sisters, children under eighteen years
of age, and fiancdes" of aliens who had applied for citizenship. 95 In 1924,
Congress amended these provisions to make wives (but not husbands) of U.S.
citizens who were residing within the United States exempt from the quotas and
gave "preference" within the quotas to husbands of citizens. 196 Almost
overnight, legal immigration status had gone from a relatively easy
acquisition-at least for a European immigrant-to a scarce benefit. Marriage
to a male citizen became one of the easiest ways to obtain this status, and in
fact was the only method that did not require a blood tie.
The reasons Congress granted superior rights based on marriage to
immigrant women over immigrant men are enormously complex.197 For our
purposes, the important point is that Congress did not grant immigration
benefits to spouses evenhandedly after determining that marriage was an
institution worth encouraging through the addition of a new benefit. Rather,
Congress granted immigration benefits in a highly gendered way that was
reflective of social norms and expectations at the time. Men were presumed
(and legally required) to be the breadwinners for their families, and women
were presumed (and legally required) to follow their husbands. At the time
Congress amended the provisions, a husband determined his wife's domicile.
98
For many years, he had also determined her citizenship. 99 The government
grafted immigration benefits onto the existing marriage system, in which the
husband-as-breadwinner and decision maker model was still dominant.200 If a
husband was expected to support his wife, then she needed to be physically
present to provide services for him in return. 201 Further, wives were understood
to undergird the stabilizing and constraining effects of the family on men.
202
195. Act ofMay 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 2(d), 42 Stat. 5,6.
196. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 4(a), 43 Stat. 153, 155.
197. For extensive discussion of the interactions of married women's citizenship law and
immigration law, see CANDICE BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND CITIZENSHIP (1998); NANCY COT: PUBLIC Vows, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
(2000); GARDNER, supra note 194; Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and
the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 (2005).
198. See Kerry Abrams, A Legal Home: Derivative Domicile and Women's Citizenship (Oct.
25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (tracing history of marital derivative domicile rule and married
women's citizenship law).
199. BREDBENNER, supra note 197 (discussing history of married women's citizenship).
200. Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 593, 600-03 (1991).
201. See Stevens, supra note 193; Nancy Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the
United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIsT. REV. 1440, 1468 (1998) (arguing that the "principle that
American male citizens ought to be able to create and sustain their chosen families" was so entrenched
that it sometimes "triumphed over the racialized nationalism of the period"); cf HARTOG, supra note
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Similarly, the new system of social security instituted as part of the New
Deal relied on then-existing legal and social understandings of marriage as a
means of determining a person's eligibility for benefits. The Social Security
Act (SSA), enacted by Congress in 1935, provided old age insurance for
workers who paid into the system through payroll taxes.20 3 This Act initially
made benefits unattainable for most women, as it specifically excluded
intermittent or short-term work and work involving "domestic service in a
private home." 204 Only 15 percent of married women worked outside the home
in 1940, and many of these were domestic workers. 205 But soon, Congress
amended the Act, accommodating women by adding benefits for widows and
aged wives of recipients. 20 6 These benefits used marriage-an established legal
institution that required husbands to support their wives-to provide new,
public benefits to women by expanding the concept of their husbands' support.
The government would not step in to support all women; rather, it would step
in when a breadwinning husband died or when he retired. The woman's support
would be tied to the man's successful performance of his role as provider.
°7
There was no reason that lawmakers had to link benefits to marriage.
Congress could have decided, for example, that each American citizen could
sponsor one immigrant of his or her choice for admission to the United States,
or designate one friend or family member (or stranger) as a beneficiary for
pension, insurance, or other benefits purposes. But marriage was a convenient
and nearly ubiquitous legal category that already carried important social and
legal meanings. Marriage was the legal and social institution that dealt with
female dependency, and it was therefore perfectly poised to be extended to
further provide for the public welfare.
208
Underlying the assumption that public benefits should be tied to marriage
was the reality that most people were married and that most wives were
financially dependent on their husbands. 20 9 Public benefits stepped in to
22, at 165 (arguing that although coverture gave husbands and wives reciprocal duties, the husbands'
duties existed not for the benefit of wives but instead to "rationalize and justify a structure of power").
202. BREDBENNER, supra note 172, at 120-21 (showing how immigration law gave immigrant
wives but not husbands nonquota status to encourage stability and morality); CoTr, supra note 197, at
155 (discussing early immigration law's attitude toward marriage).
203. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-271, §§ 201-02,49 Stat. 620.
204. Id. §§ 201(b), (c).
205. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
EcoNoMic CImZENSHIPt IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 146 (200 1).
206. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. 76-379, §§ 202(b), (d), 53 Stat. 1360,
1364, 1365.
207. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 205, at 142-46 (showing how the SSA amendments
used gender stereotypes about roles in marriage to justify the expansion of benefits for widows and
aged wives of recipients).
208. Indeed, Professor Alice Kessler-Harris has shown that lawmakers extended benefits to
wives and widows in the 1939 SSA amendments in order to pay down a surplus that they did not want
to spend on agricultural and domestic workers, who were largely black. Id. at 150.
209. See UNITED STATES CENSUS SUMMARY, Vol. 2, Table 16 (1940) (12,845,259 women in
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amplify a husband's support of his wife, not to replace it. For example, as early
as the early-nineteenth century, war widows received pensions from the
government. 2 ° These pensions were compensatory: had the husbands lived,
they would have supported their wives, so the government stepped in to replace
the husbands by fulfilling their support duties and thereby preventing war
211widows from becoming destitute. Similarly, the first wrongful death statutes
gave tort remedies to widows who had lost their breadwinning husbands, but
212
not to widowers. Many modem benefits work in a similar fashion: social
security death benefits for the spouse of a worker who has paid into the system,
for example, essentially compensate the surviving spouse for the loss of a
provider. 213 Similarly, tax breaks for married couples in which one spouse is
the primary eamer and the other specializes in domestic work are a way of
recognizing that in these families, one salary is actually supporting two people
and should be taxed less as a result.214 Employers voluntarily provide other
benefits, such as health insurance, to employees and extend these benefits to
spouses of employees as a matter of customary practice.21 5 These benefits
recognize the reality that in many families only one worker would qualify for
employment-based health care-generally by working full-time for an
employer large enough and successful enough to provide the benefit. As a
result, including spouses as beneficiaries would cover more people-largely
women involved in childrearing.
Another important reason that marriage became the site for public benefits
was that traditional marriage provided ample burdens to counteract the
temptation to marry solely for benefits. Marriage bestowed benefits, to be sure.
For husbands, these included the services of a wife; for a wife they included
financial support from her husband; for both, they included access to legal sex,
the possibility of legitimate children, and social status. 2 16 But these benefits
labor force out of female population of 65,507,688); Vol. 4, Table 5 (showing that over 61 percent of
both male and female population over age of fifteen were married, and over 80 percent of men and
women age thirty-five to forty-four were married), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/
decennialV1940.html; see also KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 205, at 146 (discussing women's
dependence on men during 1930s).
210. See Collins, supra note 4, at 1097-1106.
211. As Kristin Collins has shown, these pensions may have used a substitution theory, but in
actuality they created a new system of public benefits that gave women more than they would have
received under intestacy law. Id at 1111-12.
212. John F. Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the
Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 717 (2000); for a discussion of the ideological connections between widows' pensions,
wrongful death actions, and changes in inheritance law, see Kristin A. Collins, "Petitions Without
Number": Widows' Petitions and the Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Marriage-Based
Entitlements, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (draft on file with author).
213. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 205, at 144.
214. See Motro, supra note 2, at 1512.
215. Ash & Badgett, supra note 74.
216. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 39.
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came with teeth. A husband was entitled to his wife's services, but he had to
support her. A wife would receive support, but owed her services to her
husband. For both, the "right" to sex also entailed a duty to engage in it.
217
Since exiting a marriage was very difficult, the state did not need to worry that
a person would marry only to obtain benefits because, sooner or later, the
individual would feel the burdens as well.
Marriage was therefore not an irrational institution on which to graft
public benefits. A person who is committed for life to another person is
unlikely to choose that person only for his health insurance, his pension, or his
military housing benefits. Even if a person were this instrumental, she would be
stuck forever with the person she chose-along with his insurance, pension,
and housing-and so we might not worry too much about the social conse-
quences of her seemingly private decision. But the addition of a cluster of new
public benefits to the benefits-burden equilibrium changed marriage: there were
simply more reasons to marry without a counteracting increase in burdens. We
might say that the "carrots" offered for entering marriage increased.
2. The Rise of No-Fault Divorce
Soon after the "carrots" associated with marriage increased, the "stick"
that had traditionally kept spouses married-and therefore deterred spouses
from entering marriage lightly-all but disappeared. Prior to the 1970s, almost
all states had only fault-based divorce. 218 Fault grounds typically included
abandonment, adultery, impotency, and extreme cruelty. 219 Some states had
even more restrictive laws: New York's only ground for divorce until 1967 was
adultery, 22  and South Carolina did not allow judicial divorce at all until
1949. 221 Even where fault-based divorce was available, a spouse seeking one
had to demonstrate that he or she was the innocent and injured spouse. 2 22 If
both parties were guilty, then the defendant could use the defense of
217. Id.
218. Although they were not styled as "no-fault" laws, several states did experiment with
expansive divorce grounds before the 1970s. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75
IND. L.J. 875, 887 (2000).
219. Heather Flory, "I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey... And Not Divorce You": Covenant
Marriage and the Backlash Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 FAM. L.Q. 133, 137 (2000).
220. New York went from providing for divorce only in cases of adultery in 1966 to providing
divorce on multiple grounds, including cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, imprisonment of
three or more consecutive years, adultery (with an expansive definition that included oral or anal
sexual conduct), or living apart pursuant to a decree or judgment of separation for a period of two or
more years. 1966 N.Y. LAWS 833, 834 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 170(1)-(6)
(McKinney 2010)). This last ground was changed to one year in 1968. Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law
Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 410 n.196 (2007). New
York State amended its no-fault statute in 2010 to allow for unilateral no-fault. 2010 N.Y. SESS. LAWS
ch. 384 (McKinney).
221. DiFonzo, supra note 218, at917 (2000).
222. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 162.
[Vol. 100:1
MARRIAGE FRA UD
11 223
recrimination" to block the divorce. In 1970, California passed the nation's
second no-fault divorce law, which made divorce available at the request of
either party in cases of irreconcilable differences.2 24 Many other states followed
suit, so that within several years, most states in the nation offered at least the
option of no-fault divorce.
225
Of course, people did get out of unhappy marriages before the advent of
no-fault divorce. As legal historian Hendrik Hartog has shown, separation
without divorce was more common than has been appreciated.2 26 And collusive
divorces, where one spouse privately agreed to allow the other to bring an
adversarial suit on grounds of adultery or cruelty, were more common than
genuinely contested divorces by the mid-twentieth century. 22 7 Nevertheless,
even collusive divorce required two people who wanted to divorce, or at least
recognized that one of them wanted it enough that it was not worth the other's
energy to fight it. In contrast, no-fault divorce made divorce possible even
where one party vehemently opposed it. No-fault divorce, therefore, made the
possibility of unilateral marriage fraud-fraud engaged in by only one
spouse-easier.
No-fault divorce also made bilateral fraud easier. Under the fault system,
couples had the option of obtaining collusive divorces, but there were no
guarantees of success. The law still required an "innocent and injured" spouse to
demonstrate grounds for divorce. If a judge did not believe that the grounds
were genuine, or did not find the plaintiff to be innocent of fault, the unlucky
couple might find themselves married forever.228 No-fault divorce changed this
dynamic; now, both spouses could be equally culpable and still get the divorce
229
one or both of them wanted. If the increased use of collusive divorce under
223. Id.
224. See Flory, supra note 219, at 137 (stating that "[i]n 1969 California became the first state
to adopt a 'pure' no-fault divorce statute. One by one, states followed California's lead, adopting
similar statutes establishing 'irretrievable breakdown' or 'incompatibility' as grounds for divorce.").
225. Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63
OR. L. REv. 649, 664, n.60 (1984). For an illustration of the rise in divorce rates from the mid-
nineteenth century into the 1970s and 1980s, see Paul C. Glick & Sung-Ling Lin, Recent Changes in
Divorce and Remarriage, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737 (1986). According to the Glick-Lin report, the
divorce rate per 1,000 married women rose steadily from 0.3 in 1867 to 5.3 in 1979. Despite dips to
1.3 during the Great Depression and 2.1 during the baby boom, the divorce rate continued an upward
trend across the twentieth century, nearly doubling from 2.5 in 1965 to 5.3 in 1979. Id. at 738. The
current divorce rate is 3.4 per 1,000 population, as compared to a marriage rate of 6.8 per 1,000 total
population. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths:
Provisional Data for 2009, NAT'L VrrAL STAT. REP., Aug. 27, 2010, at 1 tbl.A, available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_25.pdf.
226. See HARTOG, supra note 22,passim.
227. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 163 (estimating that 90 percent of divorces
were "collusive and fraudulent" under the fault system).
228. See, e.g., Kucera v. Kucera, 117 N.W. 2d 810 (N.D. 1962) (denying wife's petition for
divorce where she demonstrated extreme cruelty but her husband's counterclaim also demonstrated
that she was guilty of cruelty toward him).
229. Under most no-fault regimes, the only impediment to the grant of a unilaterally sought
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the fault grounds in the early- and mid-twentieth century made the instrumental
use of marriage somewhat more likely, the availability of no-fault made it much
more so. The possibility of "divorce on demand" created the potential for the
widespread instrumental use of marriage as a vehicle for opting into particular
benefits of marriage and then opting out before the burdens became oppressive.
3. The Decriminalization of Nonmarital Sex
Finally, the third important twentieth-century change in marriage was a
shift in the social and legal norms regarding extramarital sexuality. By the
1970s, in many communities a person no longer needed to be married to have
a socially sanctioned sexual relationship. 230 Although statutes criminalizing
adultery and fornication were still on the books in many states (and still are
today231), states did not widely enforce these statutes in the latter third of the
twentieth century. 232 In fact, the pervasiveness of collusive divorce throughout
the twentieth century, where adultery was often the alleged ground, indicates a
general lack of criminal enforcement-if prosecution were a likely outcome,
many people would not likely have been willing to falsely claim to have
committed adultery. Thus, as early as 1932, Karl Llewellyn could say, "Are
we to take the statutes against fornication and adultery seriously today?,
233
Since nonmarital sex was unlikely to be punished, fewer people felt the need
to marry at all.
Despite the lack of criminal enforcement, the law did regulate nonmarital
sex. Until recently, courts continued to "invoke fornication and adultery
provisions in order to explain why injuries inflicted by nonmarital intercourse
are noncompensable; the theory [wa]s that the plaintiffs crimes should not
provide the basis for her recovery in tort."234 In addition, adultery and
divorce is separation for a specified time period. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §302
(a)(2) (1974) (divorce granted if court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken supported by
evidence that the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of more than 180 days). And in
states that have adopted the UMDA, an even faster divorce is available if a party can show "serious
marital discord." Id. For an extensive discussion of waiting periods and a critique of the logic of
requiring a waiting period, see Difonzo, supra note 218, at 945-49.
230. This is not to say that there is not still an aspiration that sex should occur exclusively
within marriage, especially in particular localities. But even where this aspiration is widely shared, its
practice is not widely successful. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES v. BLUE
FAMILIEs: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CuLTuRE 2 (2010) (arguing that families in
"red states" have a different set of values regarding marriage, sexuality, and child-rearing than families
in "blue states," and that the "red families" often fail to live up to their ideals).
231. BOWMAN, supra note 146, at 16 n.22 (noting that, as of January 2009, Idaho, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia retained criminal fornication
statutes and that Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia retained criminal cohabitation statutes).
232. Anne Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (1998) (noting a lack of criminal
enforcement).
233. K. N. Llewellyn, Behindthe Law ofDivorce: 1, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1299 (1932).
234. Coughlin, supra note 232, at 23.
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fornication have been "zealously" prosecuted within the military against
soldiers.235 And some courts continue to base child custody decisions on the
extramarital sexual behavior of the children's parents, or alter alimony or pro-
236perty determinations if one of the divorcing spouses committed adultery. But
by the early twentieth century, outright criminal prosecution was on the wane,
and in 2003 the Supreme Court finally declared the criminalization of private
sexual behavior unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas.2 37 The Lawrence
decision had implications for civil enforcement as well. In 2005, a court held
that, under Lawrence, it was unconstitutional to use Virginia's fornication
statute to preclude a tort cause of action for negligent transmission of herpes.
238
As sex outside of marriage became more acceptable, both legally and
socially, the legal disabilities surrounding illegitimacy began to disappear. At
common law, nonmarital children were "bastards" and were denied the right to
inherit.239 This gave parents a strong incentive to marry if they wanted their
children to be socially and financially secure. Beginning in the 1960s, however,
the Supreme Court began to dismantle the legal distinction between marital and
nonmarital children. It held, for example, that nonmarital children were entitled
to claims under Louisiana's Wrongful Death Act for the death of their mother
just as marital children were, and that a nonmarital child could recover under
state workers' compensation law for the death of a father. 24 Nonmarital
children continue to be treated differently than marital children for some
purposes, including the inheritance law of some states, 24' but speaking very
generally, the social and legal stigmas attached to nonmarital children have
declined dramatically in the past century.
These changes, coupled with the ease of access to no-fault divorce, made
marriage less of a "stick." The threat of permanence no longer existed, nor did
the threat of becoming a social and legal outsider if one divorced, or, for that
matter, failed to marry. A person could now become a mother or father and
have short- or long-term sexual relationships, all outside of marriage, without
235. Id. at 24.
236. See Ira Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modem Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 783,
783 n.26 (1996) (noting that fifteen states still give their courts discretion to consider fault in alimony
adjudications and property allocations); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 817 (2010).
237. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas homosexual sodomy statute).
238. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005); cf In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003)
(striking down Georgia's fornication statute on the grounds that it violated the state constitution's right
to privacy).
239. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *454 ("rights and incapacities [of] bastard
children").
240. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (Wrongful Death Act recovery); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (worker's compensation recovery).
241. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (nonmarital child of U.S. citizen father
required to submit more proof of relationship to father than marital child); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971) (denial of right of intestate succession to nonmarital child not unconstitutional).
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fear of prosecution or social shunning. Marriage, while still a powerful insti-
tution, had lost some of its coercive force. It could now be used instrumentally,
purely to obtain a benefit, and discarded when the parties no longer needed it.
B. Harms to the Public
The mere fact that marriage can be used instrumentally, however, does not
mean that the government should waste resources preventing people from
doing so. After all, people enter into relationships all the time for instrumental
reasons, such as when they enter into employment contracts to earn money.
What makes marriage fraud different from some other instrumental uses of
institutions is its harm to the state, or at least lawmakers' perception of this
harm. The intensity of the (perceived) harm must vary, because of the wide
range of responses, from simple formal marriage rules to highly intrusive, and
expensive to administer, integrated rules such as the "establish a life" test.
What follows is an analysis of the potential harms to the state and why the tests
vary as much as they do.
1. The Concept of Harm: Fraud on the Market
A first step to understanding why the state feels harmed by marriage fraud
is to understand marriage fraud not as private contractual fraud, but as fraud on
the public. In contractual annulment-for-fraud cases, identifying the victim was
easy-so easy, in fact, that the fraud made the marriage voidable but not void. 42
The victimized spouse, and only the spouse, could end the marriage, but the
victim's family members, community, the public at large, and the state had no
standing to challenge the validity of the marriage if the victim was content to
remain married.243 In the public benefits marriage fraud cases, harm to one of
the spouses suddenly becomes irrelevant, or, at most, only part of the problem.
Instead, the harm is to the public at large or even to the state itself. In this
respect, the new marriage fraud doctrines resemble another body of twentieth-
century law, the federal criminal law that established new crimes, including
financial fraud.244 As William Stuntz observed, the old canard that "ordinary
lying is not a crime" is no longer true: "a good deal of ordinary lying fits within
the definition of one or another federal felony." 245 Criminal financial fraud, like
marriage fraud, no longer requires an individual victim.246 In fact, in many
242. See supra Part 1, notes 18-19.
243. See supra Part 1.
244. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (defining a "scheme... to defraud" as used in federal
mail and wire fraud statutes to "include[] a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services").
245. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 517-
18(2001).
246. David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar
Crime, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1446 (2008) (criticizing criminal securities fraud as a crime in search
of a victim).
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cases the person who normally would be in the place of "victim" may have
benefited from the fraud. Just as two people might collude in marriage fraud to
seek the benefits of marriage, the shareholders of a particular corporation might
benefit from fraud that enhances the corporation's stock prices even if the fraud
harmed the public by distorting the market.
The financial fraud context offers a preliminary answer to the question of
how the public can be a victim. Altering the functioning of the market could
harm everyone, because participants in the market rely on the "integrity" of
the market price, which is in turn set by the millions of exchanges occurring
on the market every day.247 This "fraud on the market" theory is useful for
thinking about marriage fraud because it recognizes that the harms of fraud
might be diffuse and difficult to quantify and nevertheless cause genuine
248harm. The analogy also suggests that marriage fraud will be difficult to
police and require ever-changing methods as defrauders develop new
techniques for working the system.
249
2. Harms to the Public in Marriage Fraud Cases
Marriage fraud, like financial fraud, might impose diffuse harms on the
public. Hence, even without individual, identifiable victims, lawmakers appear
to have a strong hunch that they must do something to prevent the instrumental
use of marriage. Although marriage fraud does not distort stock prices, it could
entail significant harm to the public, both financial and expressive.
a. Financial Harms
First, marriage fraud might harm the public by costing it money. If the
evil-doers did not commit fraud to gain access to benefits, then society could
better spend the money somewhere else. Social security benefits given to a
spouse could instead go back into the social security system to be spent on
someone else. If the entity giving the benefit is a private employer, as with
health insurance, employer-sponsored pensions, or even gym memberships, the
harm to the public is less direct but still present-the fraud will cost the
employer money, and the employer will pass on these costs to consumers, that
is, the public. The employer may also pass the costs on to other insureds in the
247. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988). But see Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (holding that to recover in a fraud-on-the-market case, a plaintiff
must demonstrate more than just an inflated stock price but also show actual economic loss).
248. See RicHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §15.8 423-24 (3d ed. 1986), cited
in 485 U.S. 224, 254 n.5 (White, J, dissenting in part) (noting that the question of damages under
fraud-on-the-market theory is problematic because it rests on assumptions about social costs that are
difficult to quantify).
249. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973 (2006)
(arguing that open-ended tests are necessary because the defrauder "seeks to accomplish indirectly...
what would not be permitted directly"; she attempts to "take without violating the basic prohibition
against theft").
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pool-other employees of that particular employer, or other employees who
use the same services.
But in the case of marriage, a problem lurks behind this theory of harm.
What if the couple had a bona fide marriage and not a "fake" one? Then,
presumably, they would be entitled to claim the benefit. In theory, each "ideal
worker"250 is entitled to include one spouse as a beneficiary on his insurance
policy, as a beneficiary for social security purposes and as a dependent for tax
purposes. It is not as if we ration marriage licenses because we cannot afford to
have everyone in society marry. Why should the public care how successful,
honest, or satisfying his marriage is, so long as he is not claiming benefits for
more than one spouse?
Perhaps the answer lies in the structure of the benefits markets
themselves. On their surface, these markets appear to assume that benefits
should be freely allocated to ideal workers, their spouses, and their children. In
reality, however, the system operates on the tacit assumption that not everyone
has a spouse. Single workers effectively subsidize health insurance for their
married co-workers' spouses. Similarly, in the context of immigration, U.S.
citizens are entitled to sponsor an immigrant spouse, but the system assumes
that most citizens will marry other citizens so that the number of citizens
sponsoring immigrant spouses will remain low as a percentage of the total pop-
ulation. And we could even think of the federal tax system as burdening some
types of couples to benefit others: the total cost of the marriage "bonus" given
to some couples is largely offset by the marriage penalty imposed on others. 1
If we understand marriage benefits as subsidized by those who do not use
them (or, in the case of the marriage bonus and penalty, subsidized by those
who do not perform marriage in a traditional breadwinner/homemaker fashion),
the "marriage-plus" rules and functional tests suddenly look not only like fraud
prevention mechanisms but also like methods for cabining the definition of
marriage. This limitation ensures that not everyone can claim marital benefits
and enough benefits will remain for those who conform to the privileged
definition. 2 The contractual system of marriage as privatized welfare worked
250. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: How WORK AND FAMILY CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 1, 274 (2000) (arguing that market work is organized around the ideal of a
worker who works full-time and overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child
rearing).
251. According to government reports, in 1996 more than twenty-one million married couples
found their tax bills increased by an average of nearly $1,400 because they filed jointly, while another
twenty-five million found their tax bills decreased by an average of about $1,300. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 29-30 (1997),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/fipdocs/Oxx/doc7/marriage.pdf. Additionally, in that year, aggregate
marriage penalties totaled about $29 billion while marriage benefits added up to about $33 billion. Id.
252. Cf Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where,
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1762
(2001) (noting that employees with more dependents frequently obtain perquisites worth more than
those offered to single or childless employees).
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best when everyone was married; the more recent system of using marriage as a
proxy for entitlement to benefits works best if not everyone can qualify.
This theory of harm may partially explain the myriad cases involving gay
people who, helped by their friends, engage in marriage fraud in order to be
with, or obtain benefits for, their partners who are ineligible because of the
different-sex requirement discussed previously. 253 Numerous immigration and
military benefits cases, for example, involve a U.S. citizen marrying the partner
of a gay friend so that he can be reunited with his partner. 254 In these cases, the
fraud does not result from too many immigrants being sponsored but rather
from the wrong person sponsoring the immigrant. The U.S. citizen sponsor is
not sponsoring a second spouse; he is merely using his ability to sponsor a
spouse, which would otherwise go unused, to help a friend. Nor is the "real"
husband-the gay U.S. citizen-sponsoring anyone at all; in fact, he is
forgoing his ability to sponsor a spouse and instead allowing a friend to do it
for him. The harm, then, is not that an "extra" person obtained a status-both
U.S. citizens were, in fact, entitled to sponsor someone for that status. Instead,
the harm is that the system is simply not designed to allow everyone to claim a
spouse, and someone whom the system has excluded is nevertheless attempting
to claim the benefit.
255
A slight twist on this theory is the theory that marriage fraud robs insurers,
both private and public, of their ability to adequately predict the payouts they
must make. Health insurance and life insurance companies, for example, set
rates and make predictions based on actuarial tables showing the statistical
likelihood of death at given ages; insurance companies and public insurance
programs, such as social security, make similar predictions about the likelihood
of a person having a disability, being married, or having other dependents. The
harm to the public if someone claims a spouse who is not "really" his or her
spouse is not only that the state is forced to pay for someone it did not
anticipate having to pay for, but that the claimant has robbed the state of its
253. See infra Subsection II.B.5.
254. See, e.g., Gustavo Arellano, What's a Little Marriage Fraud Between Amigos?, PHOENIX
NEw TtMEs, July 8, 2010, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2010-07-08/news/what-s-a-little-
marriage-fraud-between-amigos (discussing a woman marrying her gay friend so that he could remain
in the country); Heather Ratcliffe, Sham Marriage Nets Year of Probation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Oct. 13, 2007, at A10 (explaining how a gay man arranged a marriage between his friend and his
partner so that his partner could stay in the country); see also Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d
172, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (referring to marriage between a gay man and a lesbian as fraudulent even
though they testified it was intended to "provide companionship for both parties"); Correa v.
Pasquarell, No. SA-02-CA-0960-RF, 2004 WL 212935 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (describing an allegation by
I.N.S. that a woman's marriage was not bona fide because she was a lesbian and her husband was a
gay man); United States v. Philips, 52 M.J. 268, 269 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (involving a servicemember
charged with larceny for entering into sham marriage so he could move off-base with his gay partner).
255. Cf Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797-99 (upholding against equal protection challenge
Congress's definition of "child" as excluding children of unmarried fathers, and noting that Congress
frequently provides "some-but not all-families with relief from various immigration restrictions").
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ability to make predictions about the number of claimants and ensure that its
programs are adequately funded.256
b. Expressive Harms
So marriage fraud might be expensive for the state. Might it also result in
expressive harms? Many of the antifraud pronouncements Congress has made
involve not expense but concern about protecting marriage itself. As
Representative Barney Frank put it during hearings on the IMFA, "[m]arriage
is a very important and a very sacred institution, and we should not stand by
while people trifle with it to get into the country." 257 This kind of expressive
harm might be thought of not as fraud on the market, but as fraud on the voters.
Voters elect legislators who put a certain kind of public benefits program in
place, which rewards certain kinds of marriages-that is, heterosexual and
gender-traditional. Use of marriage fraud to obtain the benefit without
conforming to the statutorily imposed definition of marriage denies voters and
the citizenry their public policy preferences as expressed in voting practices.
Anxiety about harm to marriage as an institution could also justify the
"establish a life" test. The logic goes something like this: if a couple is willing
to marry and to live so as to create the appearance of sincere companionship,
then their private motives for marrying will not damage the institution. Put
differently, their willingness to embrace the "stick" aspects of marriage-
commitment, mutual support, and conjugality-justifies their interest in a
particular "carrot." But if they are unwilling to embrace the stick, the institution
might crumble.
According to some critics, the instrumental use of marriage does not just
cheapen marriage. It also undermines marriage from within by de-gendering
the institution.258 In this view, the fact that public benefits are structured to
encourage traditional breadwinner/homemaker gender roles cuts in favor of
maintaining them. Individuals who are not willing to take on these roles but
want the benefits anyway threaten the institution by making it less about
civilizing men, protecting against female dependency, and nurturing
children.259 Instead, for couples unwilling to conform to traditional marriage
roles, marriage is about the two individuals who make up the marital unit and
their autonomous needs. With this theory in mind, we can read Boyter, the
"divorce fraud" tax case, as punishing a couple for having the audacity to create
256. Of course, the state often does not adequately fund its programs. The point here is that it is
not only the cost to the state that is the problem, but the threat to the state's ability to plan.
257. 132 CONG. REC. 27,016 (1986) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
258. See, e.g., Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11
(2004) (arguing that along with implicating separation of powers issues, judicial treatment of the civil
union/marriage debate ignores the overall policy concerns inherent in the gendered nature of
marriage); see generally Wardle, supra note 9 (arguing that civil unions cannot advance the social
goals that gendered marriage can and has done historically).
259. See Wardle, supra note 9, at 779-80.
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a dual-breadwinner family. Marriage in this view is not an equal institution, but
instead a status that shapes behavior along gendered lines to produce societally
beneficial results.
A similar critique underlies the common charge that same-sex marriages
are "counterfeit" or "fake., 260 Since same-sex couples cannot procreate with
each other without outside help, some scholars have accused them of seeking
"marriages of convenience entered into primarily for the tangible benefits."' 261
A "real" marriage, on this theory, would be one in which the couple engaged in
procreative sex. To return to the example mentioned in the financial harms
section above, a person who uses a fraudulent immigration marriage to a third
party to facilitate reunification with that party's same-sex partner might be
understood as harming the public financially by taking a spot that would not
otherwise have been used. But such a marriage also alters marriage itself by
introducing an alternative model that involves neither gendered roles nor
procreative sex.
A problem with both of these critiques is that they make assumptions
about what marriage is that may simply be untrue for many people. In order to
identify an expressive harm to marriage, we must identify what marriage is, and
how exactly the expression of a different vision dilutes, misrepresents, or
destroys it. But there seems to be little cultural consensus on what marriage is
today.262 The greater harm to marriage may occur not from opening it up to
more types of people, but from insisting that it is a coercive, gendered
institution, one that many people might find unappealing.
263
One other expressive harm might result from marriage fraud, particularly
in the immigration context. Fraud might be a kind of invasion of the polity, an
unwanted inclusion of new members whom the state would not have chosen if
it had known the truth about them. An important purpose behind granting
immigration status based on marriage is the idea that marriage serves a
civilizing function. Immigrants will be more successful and assimilate more
quickly if they are married to U.S. citizens; marriage tames the immigrant and
260. See Courtney M. Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the
Law's Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393, 397 (2007) (arguing that "the
counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relations... is intimately tied to concerns about sodomy and same-
sex procreation--each of which. is viewed as a fraudulent imitation that not only threatens the
currency of marriage but also represents a kind of economic fraud").
261. George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L.
424, 424 (2004), cited in Cahill, supra note 260, at 450. Cahill also quotes Pat Robertson making a
similar claim: "[Homosexuals are] self-absorbed narcissists who are willing to destroy any institution
so long as they can have affirmation of their lifestyle." Id. at 446.
262. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 230 (delineating two different visions of family life in
America); COONTZ, supra note 46 (showing various meanings of marriage over time).
263. See Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the
Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUM. 1, 33-35 (2009) (arguing that vision of
marriage endorsed by some justices in state same-sex marriage litigation is unlikely to appeal broadly
to the public).
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turns him into a citizen. 264 A person who uses marriage fraudulently to obtain
lawful status becomes a member-first as a green-card holder, which in turn
creates eligibility for naturalized citizenship-without undergoing the
acculturating process that marriage is imagined to produce.265 An undeserving
interloper now has the opportunity to become a citizen, saddling the citizenry
with an unqualified new member and leaving a more deserving immigrant
waiting in line.
Public benefits marriage fraud, then, could cause the state harm, whether
financial or expressive. Such harm would have no particular victim; instead the
harm would be dispersed across the public. Some people, however, might
experience more concentrated harm than others. For instance, people pushed
back in the queue for a green card would suffer more from immigration
marriage fraud than the citizenry in general.
But the types of harm experienced by the state may not be as compelling
upon closer examination. The financial harms result not from thievery but from
the way the system is structured. It is designed to reward marriage-and particu-
lar forms of marriage, at that-by taxing the nonmarried and those in egalitarian
marriages. If the benefits are intended as a carrot, then should it be any surprise
that people are willing to marry to get them? 2 66 And the potential expressive
harms force us to ask what exactly marriage is, who gets to control its meaning,
and why doing exactly what the state is incentivizing people to do-marrying
for a benefit-is wrong if they are not also marrying for other reasons.
IV.
RECONFIGURING MARRIAGE
We saw in Part II that, in many cases, marriage, standing alone, is a poor
proxy for eligibility for entitlements, and in those cases, lawmakers try to further
circumscribe who will be eligible by crafting tests that either add additional
formal requirements, such as a time lapse, age, or cohabitation, to marriage, or
add functional requirements for performing marriage in an idealized way. Put
another way, marriage turns out to be a poor proxy in some circumstances
264. See Kerry Abrams, Becoming a Citizen: Marriage, Immigration, and Assimilation, in
GENDER EQUALITy: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Linda McClain & Joanna
Grossman eds., 2009); see also INA § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2006) (reducing residency
requirement for obtaining naturalized citizenship from five years to three years where immigrant is
married to U.S. citizen during the period of residency).
265. In the case of gay or lesbian immigrants in long-term relationships, of course, this
acculturation process would have occurred, just not through the official sponsor. But perhaps in these
cases the problem for the state is that the wrong acculturation process has occurred. The rules of
immigration, like tax and social security law, encourage marriages structured along traditional gender
lines, and by acculturating through a same-sex relationship, the inmigrant has evaded this form of
acculturation. See Abrams, supra note 264 (arguing that heterosexual marriage functions as a crucible
for becoming a citizen and critiquing this process).
266. See Medina, supra note 188, at 711 ("Engaging in conduct to avail oneself of a
governmental benefit does not, in and of itself, cause harm to the government or to the public.").
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because it is overinclusive; it is simply too easy to get married for instrumental
purposes, and lawmakers must do something to tighten up the system.
But even in those circumstances where the law has not added "plus" or
functional tests to the formal marriage requirements, we might still ask
whether marriage is a good proxy for benefit eligibility. It is possible, in other
words, that marriage is actually a radically underinclusive proxy for eligibility.
As we saw in Part I1, marriage fraud's harm to the state is largely a harm to a
system predicated on the idea that married people are worthier recipients of
benefits because they are married and that marriage as a concept has a single
meaning worth defending. Society demands that marriage do an enormous
amount of work, and it important to ask whether marriage is the right
mechanism for determining eligibility at all.
This final Part explores the consequences of asking marriage to do so much
work. First, it argues that grafting so many benefits ortto marriage has costs.
Second, it argues that these costs suggest that we might be better off dis-
aggregating public benefits from marriage and explores how this might be done.
A. The Costs of Tying Public Benefits to Marriage
Despite the harms the state suffers from marriage fraud, there are good
reasons to think that marriage fraud doctrines should be abandoned, or at least
modified. These reasons are not the result of problems with the marriage fraud
doctrines themselves. The fraud doctrines are merely a symptom of an
underlying problem-the law's continued overreliance on marriage as a
privileged status for public benefits.
1. Marriage Targets the Wrong Beneficiaries
One cost of using marriage as a proxy for benefit eligibility is that it
simply may not work. Marriage, as we have seen, is often a poor enough proxy
for entitlement that the law imposes other requirements, whether they are
formal "plus" rules or fuzzy functional tests to demonstrate eligibility. These
tests presuppose that there is a cultural ideal of marriage that can be translated
easily into a legal test. Whether this was true at one point in time is
debatable,267 but it seems clear that enough people have abandoned these
cultural ideals today that marriage practice varies substantially. As we saw with
some of the more intrusive, "integrated" tests such as the "establish a life" test,
the standards to which we hold people in obtaining some benefits are standards
that much of the formally married population could not meet if so tested. No-
fault divorce and the decriminalization of sex led to the development of many
267. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 2 (1992) (arguing that "many of our 'memories' of traditional family life [are]
myths" and that "[f]amilies.. . have never lived up to nostalgic notions about 'the way things used to
be"').
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marriage fraud doctrines, but it does not follow that we therefore need to
require more than simply formal marriage to protect marriage from fraud.
Instead, we might conclude that marriage is simply no longer capable of
serving as a proxy for public benefits eligibility.
In fact, some of the factors that led to the grafting of public benefits onto
marriage are the very reasons that marriage is no longer a good criterion for
determining eligibility. When public benefits were initially allocated on the
basis of marital status, marriage was becoming less permanent, but the vast
majority of people who married stayed married until one of the spouses died.268
The maIjority of married women did not work outside the home or worked very
little; marriage was the way in which women obtained financial security.
269
There was a cultural and legal consensus that sex and procreation were best left
to married couples, and so public benefits that encouraged or rewarded
marriage were less controversial than they are today.
Flash forward to 2012, where marriage's role in managing dependency
and childrearing has changed dramatically. Today, people are much less likely
to marry and much more likely to divorce. 270 When they do marry, women
today are more likely to be in the labor force than they were before; most
married women work outside the home, and nearly half of married women not
only work but work full-time.271 And marriage is also no longer the nearly
exclusive site for procreation: approximately 40 percent of births are to
unmarried mothers.272 In the 1930s, most women were married, it was likely
that a married woman with children would have little or no income of her own,
and the premature loss of her husband would have been financially devastating.
Although some families today are structured similarly to a 1930s family,
marriage is simply no longer an accurate predictor of female dependency or the
existence of dependent children.
Even if marriage is not always an accurate predictor of dependency, it still
might be a good idea to sometimes use marriage, or something like it, to
268. Between 1930 and 1935, the marriage rate in the United States hovered between
approximately 8 and 10 per 1,000 in population, while the divorce rate was only approximately 1.5 per
1,000. Thomas C. McCormick & Douglas W. Oberdorfer, Marriage and Divorce Rates in Wisconsin,
1920-35, 47 AM. J. SOC. 563, 565 (1942).
269. See KESSLER-HARRIs, supra note 205, at 146.
270. In 2009, there were 6.8 marriages per 1,000 people; and 3.4 divorces per 1,000 people.
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 225, at 1 tbl.A. Compare to the rates in the 1930s,
supra note 268.
271. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-11-0396,
EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES-2010, at 10 tbl.5 (2011), available at http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf, tbl.5 (finding that among married women with children under
eighteen in 2010, 47.5 percent were employed full-time and 64.4 percent were employed overall).
272. In 2008, nonmarital births were 41 percent of all births; in 2009, 26 percent of children
lived with one parent, and 79 percent of those children lived with their single mother. FED.
INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN IN BRIEF: KEY
NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING, 2010, at 4 (2010), available at http://www.childstats.
gov/pdf/ac2010/ac_l0.pdf.
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subsidize caregiving in the home through entitlements. Lawmakers might
decide, for example, that spouses who take time off from full-time paid work to
care for children are made economically vulnerable through this choice and
should be protected through entitlements. But marriage no longer appears to be
a neat proxy for who should get this entitlement. Instead, lawmakers might
want to ask whether a person has lost market income because of care work and
determine whether this kind of care work is something the government wants to
subsidize, regardless of whether the person is married to an "ideal worker,"
cohabiting with one, or single.2 73 If the state is going to subsidize dependency,
marriage is no longer the way--or at least not the only way-to do it.
Lawmakers should ask specifically why they believe marriage functions well as
a proxy for benefit eligibility, and then determine whether it is as good a proxy
as they assume before reflexively grafting more benefits onto marriage at the
expense of other methods of benefits allocation.
274
A problem related to the inaccurate targeting of beneficiaries is the
institutional competence (or lack thereof) of those who make decisions about
marriage fraud. Indeed, the functionaries who determine which marriages are
fraudulent may be ill equipped to do so. In the classic annulment case, it was
the parties to the marriage who determined whether the fraud was egregious
enough to bring a claim for annulment. This doctrine supported family privacy
by preventing interested (or simply nosy) third parties from intruding. In
contrast, the public benefits marriage fraud doctrines sometimes invalidate even
those marriages that couples experience as genuine. The people making these
decisions may not be trustworthy, and the opportunity for review of their
determinations is limited.275 Family law courts may be notoriously subjective
273. See FINEMAN, supra note 8, at 228 (proposing the abolition of marriage as a legal category
and in its place "the construction of protections for the nurturing unit of caretaker and dependent"); see
also MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTWVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S
POLITICAL IDEALS 105 (2010) (arguing that the state's interest in privileging adult intimate
relationships is caretaking, and so the state therefore has an interest in supporting a "considerably
broader range of relationships than the heterosexual couples who can now choose to marry... the state
has valid reason to support all of the following horizontal relationships involving caretaking: two
elderly sisters who live together and take care of one another, a nonmonogamous homosexual couple,
a commune of five adults who live together with their children, and a heterosexual married couple").
274. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric,
81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2186 (1995) [hereinafter Fineman, Masking Dependency] (arguing that
"politicians and pundits" refuse to "address and to assess the continued viability of ideological
assumptions" about how families function). For an example of a case in which the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that Congress was using marriage as a proxy for increased economic well-being
(and therefore a reduced need for public welfare), see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
275. See, e.g., INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2006) (limiting judicial review of
discretionary immigration decisions to questions of law); Gerald Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct
Review After the Real ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 136-37 (2006/07) (explaining that
section 242 now channels appeals directly into the circuit courts, precluding district court review, and
limits review to questions of law); cf Katherine Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WISC.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 192 (arguing that the centralized view of the state as "creating" civil marriage
"puts the state at the center of disputes over social meaning that state actors are ill-equipped
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and of varying quality, but at least they have expertise in their subject matter.
They hear family cases day in and day out and have a sense of the variety in
how couples experience married life. Other courts undertaking functional tests
of marriage and legislatures crafting functional, integrated, and "plus" rules for
determining eligibility are less likely to have this broad view of what
constitutes a "typical" marriage.276 Their value judgments are likely to conflict
with the lived experience of many people subject to their rules.277
2. Marriage Obscures Discrimination
Even though marriage is in many cases a poor proxy for eligibility, its
persistence as a legal status conferring important public benefits obscures the
inequalities it creates in the public benefits system. Many people would
welcome the opportunity to obtain the benefits currently granted through
marriage-health insurance, government- or employer-subsidized pensions, the
opportunity to sponsor a family member or friend for immigration status,
housing subsidies. It is not clear why married citizens are more deserving of
these benefits than unmarried citizens. Marriage obscures the arbitrariness of
who gets the benefits by expanding the number of people who get them and
thus preventing a public clamor for benefits for all. For some benefits, such as
health care, that lie beyond the reach of individual people absent an employer-
subsidized insurance policy, marriage prevents a significant percentage of the
population from going without. Only a little over half of single women, for
example, have health insurance, but 83 percent of married women have it,
presumably because they have access to an "ideal worker's" health care
policy.278 Marriage thus gives a veneer of stability to a system that gives
substantial benefits to people who have not paid into it directly. The moral
superiority we attach to those who marry makes these entitlements seem
institutionally to handle").
276. Scholars writing about marriage law have described the tendency of bureaucrats to
contract the rights of claimants, even absent their explicit discretion to do so, in similar contexts. See,
e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing. Framing Rules and the Future of Marital
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 823-27 (2008) (describing the phenomenon of "desk clerk law,"
where clerks refuse to allow future spouses as much control over their marital names as the law on the
books gives them); Collins, supra note 4, at 1149 (using Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy to
account for why administrative officials denied so many pension petitions to women who would have
been considered "married" under state law). This concern appears to have, at least partially, influenced
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in the Continental case, discussed supra in Section II.B. Recall that in
Continental, the court held that it was inappropriate for employers to be passing judgment on the
marriages of their employees. Unlike administrative law judges, the court suggested, private employers
invade the privacy of individuals and exceed their authority when they make subjective judgments
about the validity of marriage or divorce. See Brown v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. 10-20015 (5th Cir.
July 18, 2011), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/10/10-20015-CVO.wpd.pdf.
277. See Fineman, Masking Dependency, supra note 274.
278. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 161 (citing LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE
FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY
60 (2000)).
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earned. As Kristin Collins has shown, the federal government "redistributes far
more money to women by way of marriage-based entitlements such as Social
Security than through need-based 'welfare."' 279 Marriage is an institution
entered into primarily by the middle-class, upper-middle class, and wealthy.
In contrast, the poor are far less likely to be married at any given time, or
to ever marry.280 So if the benefits attached to marriage are so extensive that
they tempt people to commit fraud to obtain them, then why are the poor not
clamoring to marry? One reason may be that the benefits offered are
inducements that matter only once a person has moved beyond subsistence, and
marriage might actually threaten that subsistence. For many poor, single
mothers, marriage creates one more legal dependent-a husband-without
doing anything to make that dependent easier to support. 28 Poor women
frequently choose not to marry the fathers of their children because they
believe, often with good reason, that they will not contribute financially to the
well being of their families or because they are seeking a more egalitarian
relationship than they believe the fathers will offer.282 Furthermore, many of
the benefits are of use primarily to caregivers who opt out of the workforce for
periods of time. The option to take 50 percent of a spouse's social security
benefit in lieu of 100 percent of one's own, for example, is only useful if a
person has an "ideal worker" spouse and can afford to work a less-than-fulltime
schedule, something many poor people lack. So, too, with marriage-based
health insurance and the federal tax marriage bonus--couples where both
parties are equal wage-eamers but neither party is an "ideal worker," or where
both parties work full-time in multiple low-paying, part-time jobs, will reap no
tax or health-care benefits from being married. Tying public benefits to
marriage is therefore regressive-it takes taxpayer money and redistributes it to
a group that is already disproportionately wealthy. The people who are most
likely to need many of these benefits will be the least likely to obtain them.
Using marriage as a proxy for entitlement also discriminates in some
circumstances against dual-income earning couples. Several marriage benefits
can be understood as subsidizing the traditional breadwinner-homemaker
family at the expense of everyone else. Social security, for example, gives the
spouse of an eligible retiree who is herself of retirement age a choice: collect
100 percent of her own earned benefit or the equivalent of 50 percent of her
spouse's benefit instead.283 The higher-earning spouse still gets to keep 100
279. Collins, supra note 4, at 1164 (noting that "ninety-eight percent of all recipients of Social
Security survivors' benefits are women, and over forty percent of all women who receive Social
Security benefits receive them as wives rather than as workers").
280. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 230, at 3 (2010); Bernstein, supra note 5, at 159-60,
169.
281. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 5, at 1683-89 (2005).
282. Linda McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channeling
Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2133, 2146-47 (2007).
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (2006) (setting forth wife's benefits).
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percent of his benefits, so the net retirement entitlement to the couple choosing
the second option is 150 percent of the higher-earning spouse's benefits. For
many spouses (disproportionately wives), 50 percent of the husband's income
over his lifetime will be worth more than 100 percent of her own, due to lower
wages, more part-time work, and temporary absences from the labor force for
childbirth or child care.284 For a couple in this situation, the working wife's
income contributes nothing to the eventual benefit-the couple receives 150
percent of the husband's benefit, just as if she had not worked at all. All of the
money that the working wife who does not collect her own benefits contributed
to social security goes back into the system, thus giving her little incentive to
work outside the home if the work is not going to yield substantial enough
income to exceed 50 percent of her husband's income over time.285 In fact, she
would have been just as well off in terms of retirement benefits by not working
at all. So, too, the federal income tax marriage bonus that some couples receive
is largely offset by the marriage penalty imposed on others. Families paying the
penalty, generally dual-income couples, might understandably consider
themselves subsidizing a lifestyle (a traditional breadwinner/stay-at-home
spouse arrangement) through the tax system. 286 Of course, the government can
reform neither the social security nor the tax systems without harming
someone. If dual-income earners are not taxed at a higher rate, then sole
breadwinners with adult dependents will be subject to a higher tax burden,
which will increase the burden on non-wage-earning caregivers. Moreover,
repealing social security spousal benefits would primarily harm low-income
caregivers, essentially ending discrimination against one group of women at the
expense of another.287 The point here is that tying the benefits to marriage
obscures the social problem being addressed-fairly compensating non-wage-
earning caregivers for their work-and the legal system deals with this problem
at the expense of wage-earning caregivers.
288
284. For critiques of this system, see Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing
Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2059-66 (1996); Becker, supra note 4, at
276-85; Liu, supra note 4, at 12-16; McCaffery, supra note 2, at 996-1001.
285. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 987-88, 996-1005.
286. See Komhauser, supra note 66, at 645-50 (discussing effects of differential tax treatment
of married people).
287. See Alstott, supra note 284, at 2004-05 (arguing that three feminist values-achieving
equal treatment, encouraging women's market work, and assisting caregivers-cannot all be achieved
simultaneously).
288. See Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1630-31 (1996) (noting that the
current system makes women's access to benefits contingent on high levels of market work or the
longevity of their marriages and arguing that the tax system should impute wages to housework based
on its economic value and then subject those wages to payroll and income taxation, thus treating
women "who perform household labor as having earned their benefits in the same manner as waged
laborers"); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 250, at 274 (recommending that we "end the practice of
tying work benefits to the ideal worker norm in the context of Social Security, unemployment, the
Family and Medical Leave Act, ERISA, and the tax system"); Liu, supra note 4, at 46-53 (critiquing
and building on Staudt's proposal); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the
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3. Unbalancing Marriage
A third cost in asking marriage to do so much work is that the institution
may become unbalanced. Marriage currently functions as a default status that
lawmakers use reflexively when allocating public benefits. As such, it is an
ever-expanding pot of benefits with no symmetrically increased burdens. To
return to the carrot-and-stick metaphor, lawmakers keep adding carrots to
marriage without adding any corresponding sticks.289 Traditional marriage was
a balanced system in that each spouse owed duties to the other and received
benefits in return. 29 The public benefits grafted onto marriage have made
marriage lopsided, largely because people receive enormous benefits for being
married, but no longer have to do as much in return. The more benefits
lawmakers add, the more they should expect people to use marriage
instrumentally to obtain them. Hence, it may not be the spouses "fraudulently"
seeking benefits who are weakening marriage, but the lawmakers who have
asked marriage to do more than it can do. The expressive harms to marriage
caused by fraud may actually be harms resulting from marriage being too
attractive to a certain subset of the population when it no longer has a uniform
meaning. In other words, tying so many benefits to marriage may harm it-to
the extent that marriage still connotes commitment, permanence, and fidelity,
creating extensive reasons for using it instrumentally without concomitant
burdens makes it less likely to stay true to those ideals.
B. Disaggregating Marriage
During the last fifteen years, the same-sex marriage movement has
advocated for access to marriage, both as an expression of recognition and
social status291 and as a means of obtaining the "carrots" associated with
Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (examining methods of valuing housework).
289. There are a few exceptions. In 1996, for example, Congress amended the INA to require
that U.S. citizens or residents who sponsor their family members for lawful permanent resident
immigration status must sign a binding Affidavit of Support that demonstrates that they can support
the immigrant at 125 percent of the poverty line. See INA §§ 212(a)(4)(C)(ii), 213A(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), 1 183(a)(1)(A) (2006). This requirement functions as a check on the privilege of
sponsoring an immigrant: the U.S. citizen spouse must also be able to support the immigrant. Although
the Affidavit of Support system has serious flaws, see Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation
of Marriage, supra note 3, at 1700-07, it is a good example of the state attempting to add a stick when
it makes a carrot available.
290. Of course, these duties were not reciprocal and much of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
feminism was devoted to rectifying the inequalities inherent in the system. See Siegel, supra note 39,
at 1082-85. Unequal though it was, it was "balanced" in the sense that each party gained something
through marriage and simultaneously took on substantial burdens.
291. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
("Domestic partnerships lack the social meaning associated with marriage, and marriage is widely
regarded as the definitive expression of love and commitment in the United States."); In re Opinions of
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004) ("The bill's absolute prohibition of the
use of the word 'maniage' by 'spouses' who are the same sex is more than semantic. The dissimilitude
between the terms 'civil marriage' and 'civil union' is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of
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marriage. 292  Questions about whether same-sex couples should seek
recognition or whether marriage instead should be dismantled altogether have
dominated the legal scholarship produced on marriage during this period.293
Proponents of dismantling marriage argue that the discrimination inherent in
privileging the married over the unmarried is discriminatory and harmful.
294
They build on arguments, long-advanced by feminists, that even modem
marriage is tainted by its origins as a sexist and hierarchical institution.291 Some
argue that marriage operates by distinguishing between those who are engaged
in "good," state-approved sex and those who are not, thus necessarily creating a
hierarchy even if it is not based on gender.296 In contrast, proponents of
maintaining marriage insist that the state should foster marriage because the
commitment it requires of couples leads to healthier, longer-lasting families
and because we might lose an important force that binds society together if we
abandon marriage altogether.297 The marriage proponents mount similar
language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-
class status."); Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in Family
Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893, 902 (2010) ("A state-enforced difference in terminology such as that between
'marriage' and 'civil union' affects same-sex couples' status because it both reflects and reinforces
their marginalized status relative to opposite-sex couples."); Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling:
Identifying Stigma in the "Civil Union "/"Marriage " Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009)
("[Tihe 'civil union'/'marriage' distinction has a cultural meaning that will create a stigmatic injury by
reinforcing and activating dormant, dispersed sites of stereotyping and prejudice against gay men and
lesbians.").
292. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 2003)
(stating that "[tihe benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly
every aspect of life and death"); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883-84 (Vt. 1999) (enumerating the
benefits granted to spouses by Vermont law); see also Shah, supra note 98 (identifying 120 federal
laws enacted between September 1996 and December 2003 granting benefits based on marital status).
293. See, for example, the sources cited supra notes 8, 10-11.
294. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 8, at 230; POLIKOFF, supra note 8 at, 7 (arguing that
"people in any relationship other than marriage suffer, sometimes to a level of economic or emotional
devastation"); Rosenbury, supra note 8, at 219 (arguing that "marriage law has been irreparably
shaped by [its] history," in which it "soliditlied] men's position as the head of their households").
295. See POLIKOFF, supra note 8, at 48 (discussing effect of feminist critique of marriage on
gay rights movement); Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2821, 2843 (2008) (arguing that marriage justifies the maintenance of patriarchal power by "throwing
a blanket of privacy" over the family); cf Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 239, 245-49 (2001) (arguing that marriage evolved to deal with female dependency and is
therefore no longer necessary).
296. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999) (arguing against same-sex marriage because marriage perpetuates
shame surrounding sex between consenting but uncommitted adults); Katherine Franke, The
Domesticated Liberty ofLawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414-16 (2004) (arguing that
the pursuit of marriage by same-sex couples limits their freedom).
297. See MILTON C. REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 5
(1999) (identifying an "internal stance" in which a spouse makes decisions based on the best interests
of the marriage relationship and an "external stance" that allows a spouse to reflect critically on
whether a marriage serves her autonomous best interests); Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy
in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 31-42 (arguing that family law can
preserve cultural notions of family and interrelatedness in the face of social and legal change that
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arguments regardless of whether they favor opening marriage up to same-sex
couples or instead keeping it exclusive to different-sex couples. For the
exclusionists, marriage's disciplinary power is uniquely necessary for
heterosexuals, who are in danger of reproducing accidentally. 298 For the
inclusionists, marriage is an important civil right for gays and lesbians, largely
because it provides an opportunity to demonstrate responsible adulthood.299
All of these approaches share a common trait. They assume that
"marriage," even as its meaning has shifted over time, has a stable meaning
today. Scholars proposing a "menu of options" approach, for example, suggest
that we would do well to keep traditional marriage on the table but make civil
unions, domestic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiary arrangements, and
contract enforcement alternatives available as well, because they would provide
choices, allowing some people to opt out of the aspects of traditional marriage
that they do not want.300 And much of the concern that proponents of
dismantling marriage express is that if traditional marriage is allowed to persist,
it may crowd these new, potentially more appealing options off the table. 301 In
contrast, some inclusionist proponents of marriage worry that the existence of a
emphasize individual autonomy); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational
Contract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225, 1231-32 (1998) (arguing that the law has failed to, but should protect,
marital investment and discourage opportunistic defection and afford couples the opportunity to
undertake legally binding commitments in marriage).
298. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that state has a rational basis for denying marriage to same-sex couples because
they cannot accidentally reproduce); Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (holding
same); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E. 2d 15, 24-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding same); Andersen v.
King County, 138 P.3d 963, 981 (Wash. 2006) (holding the same as in Goodridge); Lewis v. Harris,
188 N.J. 415, 458 (2005) (holding same). For a critique of the accidental procreation argument, see
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 263,passim.
299. EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATrERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE'S
RIGHT TO MARRY 3, 55 (2004).
300. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Essay, Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 641, 658 (2000)
(describing the "menu of options" approach available in the Netherlands and elsewhere); Larry E.
Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 309 (2005)
(analogizing marriage to a business organization, arguing for several legal forms of association); Carol
Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic Arrangements, 1994
UTAH L. REv. 777, 810-11 (arguing that states can offer several contract options for the structuring of
relationships including civil unions and various religious unions).
301. These alternatives have appeal outside the same-sex relationship context. For example, the
civil union option created by some states may be especially popular with senior citizens, who risk
losing their social security survivor benefits on remarriage but might like traditional marriage benefits,
such as hospital visitation rights and cohabitation in care facilities. Barry Kozak, Civil Unions in
Illinois: Issues that Illinois Lawyers Should Consider, CBA REC., Apr. 2011, at 30, available at
http://www.edigitalpub.com/publication/?i=67643&p=30. California and Washington State's domestic
partnership benefits are explicitly available only to same-sex couples or different-sex couples over age
sixty-two. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.60.030(6) (Supp. 2007). For an argument that the menu-of-options approach is a temporary one that
will eventually result in marriage for all, see David D. Meyer, Fragmentation and Consolidation in the
Law of Marriage and Same-Sex Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 115 (Supp. 2010).
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marriage alternative would still perpetuate inequality, and, as a result, remain
committed to traditional marriage for all.30 2
But what is "marriage"? As the myriad marriage fraud doctrines show, the
particular package of benefits and burdens offered by marriage has varied
widely throughout the years. When courts refer to a "right to marry," they refer
not to particular benefits currently included in marriage but instead to the right
of access to whatever privileged status the state is currently offering.
30 3
Focusing solely on whether same-sex couples will have access to "marriage" or
whether couples of all stripes should have access to "marriage alternatives"
presupposes that marriage itself has a certain, fixed meaning. But there is no
reason we could not instead, or in tandem with a "menu of options" approach,
also interrogate the definition of marriage. As Suzanne Kim has recently
argued, it is possible to support "skeptical marriage equality," in which we
recognize the importance of equality for same-sex couples while
simultaneously taking a hard look at the substance of the right sought.30 4 We
need not abolish marriage outright and risk the harms to society and relation-
ships that some worry about, but neither do we need to keep marriage as the
overburdened status relationship it has become.
Instead of abolishing marriage or maintaining the status quo, we could
reconfigure marriage so that its legal meaning better represents its current
social meaning. To do this, we could classify the various benefits and
obligations of marriage into functional categories that could, in theory, be dis-
aggregated from one another.30 5 We could then think about what combinations
of functional categories might ideally make up modem marriage, and which
categories we could instead split off altogether. The core questions should be:
What do we want marriage to do, and what is marriage capable of doing?
Tax breaks (or penalties), social security benefits, health insurance for
spouses, privileged immigration status, and military benefits are all public
benefits that appear to be tied to marriage for somewhat arbitrary reasons. In
302. See, e.g., Ian Ayers, Op-Ed, Separate, Unequal: How Civil Unions Fall Short of
Marriage, HARTFORD COURANT, June 10, 2005, at A13 (arguing that the Connecticut civil union law
is inadequate because it did not grant full marriage equality).
303. For a more detailed explanation, see Scott, supra note 11, at 545-46; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 2081 (2005).
304. See Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 37 (2011).
Professor Kim's argument parallels critiques of equality feminism. Equality may be important as a
principle, but what if the results of formal gender equality are still not enough? See Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALtF. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (arguing that the
sameness/difference divide can be overcome by looking to men's and women's interests and positions
within a social and legal system rather than by focusing solely on the content of the benefit provided).
305. James Herbie DiFonzo has suggested that the debate over same-sex marriage, civil unions,
and domestic partnerships could benefit from thinking about the "bundles" that should appropriately
attach to a status based on intimacy. See DiFonzo, supra note 11, passim. See also Hamilton, supra
note 11 (arguing that marriage can be divided into functional components and only some of them
deserve state support).
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each of these cases, we should articulate what the link between the benefit and
marriage is and determine whether we should continue to tie them together.
Public benefits would instead largely be individualized (health insurance for
none or for workers or for all), or reciprocal, but not tied to marriage. For
instance, each person could designate a beneficiary, who might often be a
spouse but would not have to be.
Some benefits, like privileged, immigration status, may be difficult to
disentangle, but it is certainly not impossible. If the government's interest in
family-based immigration is in uniting families and encouraging the
assimilation of new residents, then there may be more precise ways to meet
these goals than by relying on marriage. For example, we could continue to
allow dependent children to obtain legal status as immediate relatives not
subject to quotas30 6 but also allow each citizen to sponsor just one adult without
inquiring into the nature of that relationship. We could further prohibit the
selling of the right to sponsor an adult, which would serve as a check on abuse
of the right. The law currently requires family sponsors to agree to support the
immigrants they sponsor at 125 percent of the poverty line for a substantial
period, an obligation that is enforceable by the government, should the immi-
grant seek welfare, and by the immigrant herself.30 7 This requirement might
serve as a further check on the frivolous use of the sponsorship entitlement.
Alternatively, the government might take citizens out of the sponsorship
business entirely and require a potential immigrant to demonstrate eligibility
through a combination of factors, including a demonstrated tie to a U.S.
citizen family member, employer, or even friend, education, language fluency,
or job prospects. 30 8 The road taken would depend in part on what traits
306. INA § 201(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2) (2006).
307. INA §§ 212(a)(4), 213A.
308. Canada's "points" system has partially implemented this idea. Canada's law retains family
sponsorship, but defines "family" much more broadly than the U.S. law. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
CAN., IMM 3900 E, SPONSORSHIP OF A SPOUSE, COMMON-LAW PARTNER, COMMON-LAW
CONJUGAL PARTNER OR DEPENDENT CHILD LIVING OUTSIDE CANADA 3, 6 (2010) [hereinafter
Sponsorship of a Spouse], available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/3900E.pdf (stating
that Canadians may sponsor spouses, common law partners, common law conjugal partners,
dependent children); CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., 1MM 5196 E, SPONSORSHIP OF PARENTS,
GRANDPARENTS, ADOPTED CHILDREN, AND OTHER RELATIVES 4 (2011), available at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/5196E.PDF (stating that Canadians may sponsor spouses,
common law partners, common law conjugal partners, dependent children, parents, grandparents, and
adopted children; in limited circumstances, they may also sponsor siblings, nephews, nieces, and
grandchildren; and they may sponsor any other person with whom they have a family relationship if
they have no Canadian relatives or potential sponsees that fit into one of the aforementioned
categories). In addition, immigrants to Canada may qualify under the points system if they reach a
certain level of points based on educational background, language fluency, job prospects, and family
ties, among other factors. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., IMM EG7000, APPLICATION FOR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE: FEDERAL SKILLED WORKER CLASS 3, 6 (2011), available at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/EG7.pdf
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lawmakers are trying to reward when they give someone an immigration
benefit based on marriage.
The outcomes of using an incremental approach that considers each
benefit and inquires into its specific relationship to marriage may vary.
Legislators might decide that no public benefits should be tied to marriage. Or
they might decide that strong justifications remain for tying some benefits to
marriage. But the burden would be on lawmakers to articulate the assumptions
they are making about marriage and why it would be a better proxy for
eligibility than, say, being the parent of a dependent child. Marriage would no
longer be the reflexive depository for government largesse.
Even if lawmakers decided to remove marriage as a criterion for all public
benefits, this approach would still preserve marriage as a status and avoid the
potential pitfalls of doing away with marriage altogether. Marriage would be
effectively downsized to what it was before the modem administrative state
was created. The administrative state would persist, but the link between it and
marriage would be weakened. Marriage would therefore no longer be
recognized as the most favored category for determining benefits. Even this
option would not threaten the primacy of marriage as the preferred arrangement
for long-term adult intimacy.
A rethinking of marriage need not be a question of abolishing marriage
entirely or simply letting new groups into the established status. Instead,
disaggregating public benefits from marriage would go far toward remedying
the flaws in a system that puts too much pressure on marriage. Being more
precise about what we want marriage to do and what it is actually capable of
doing would mitigate the harm of not offering it equally to everyone and
resolve the problem that many people either do not want or do not have the
opportunity to participate in it. It would also provide an avenue for a much-
needed conversation about what we mean when we use the word "marriage."
So far, this conversation has largely centered on whether marriage means
access to economic benefits or something intangible, a social recognition of a
privileged status. Perhaps instead marriage could mean a particular confi-
guration of benefits. Many of the benefits currently associated with marriage
could be severed from marriage, and either made available to everyone,
regardless of marital relation; to some people if they were willing to enter into a
publicly recognized (but not necessarily marital) relationship with another
person or other persons; or to no one at all.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of marriage fraud doctrines in the past century reveals
two important features of modem marriage: its ubiquity and its incoherence.
Marriage is the status category used to allocate benefits across a wide variety of
doctrinal legal regimes, yet it is insufficient enough as a status category that it
frequently needs to be supplemented or altered in order to function as a rough
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proxy for the behavior the entitlements are intended to reward or compensate.
This Article has offered a close exploration of marriage fraud doctrines as an
entry point for thinking about the role marriage currently plays in our legal
system and how we might recalibrate this role. The failure of marriage to
function as an adequate proxy for eligibility in many public benefit programs
may indicate that marriage is not, or is no longer, the appropriate status
category for determining eligibility for social welfare programs administered
by the state.
Marriage fraud doctrines offer just one glimpse into the legal functions
performed by twenty-first century marriage. Interrogating marriage itself is an
important part of the marriage equality and marriage alternatives projects
pursued by so many activists, academics, and same-sex couples today. If we are
to work to make marriage a more egalitarian institution, we must clearly under-
stand what it is, what it can do, and what it cannot. This Article has suggested
that we may be expecting marriage to do far more work than it is capable of
doing. But we need not do away with marriage altogether to remedy the
problem. Many scholars have theorized that marriage offers an important pre-
commitment mechanism that keeps couples together in difficult times and
provides stability for their children. A piece-by-piece downsizing-but not dis-
mantling--of marriage would begin to rectify the problem of the discrimination
and inefficiencies caused by over-privileging marriage without destroying it.
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